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“New originalism” presents a profound challenge to originalist determinacy—
that is, to the notion that original constitutional meanings alone can resolve
most constitutional controversies. Although new originalists purport to seek out
and adhere to original meanings of constitutional provisions, they acknowledge
that some original meanings are too thin to fully resolve many constitutional
questions. Such acknowledgment stands in sharp tension with traditional claims
of originalist determinacy.
While new originalism improves on “old originalism” in important ways, the
former’s break from determinacy is not clean enough. New originalists are
correct that it is neither epistemologically defensible nor normatively preferable
to attribute complete answers to constitutional controversies to original textual
meanings alone. This Article bolsters that point, responding to old originalists’
newest defenses of determinacy. Yet the Article criticizes new originalists for
their own, more limited determinacy. While new originalists maintain that
original meanings alone often are insufficient to resolve constitutional controver-
sies, they overlook the epistemic uncertainties intrinsic in ascertaining original
meanings themselves.
This Article offers an “all the way down” critique of originalist determinacy.
It challenges originalism’s ability not only to answer all constitutional ques-
tions, but also to settle reliably on single original meanings in the first place.
The Article proposes to build on two of new originalism’s tools—its embrace
of thin original meanings and its distinction between interpretation and
construction—and to build as well on historicist critiques of originalism to
create a new approach to epistemic uncertainty in constitutional interpretation.
The approach is called “interpretive modesty.”
* Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. © 2016, Heidi Kitrosser. I owe many thanks to
Saul Cornell, David Dana, Stephen Griffin, Andy Koppelman, Tim O’Neill, and Larry Solum for very
thoughtful feedback. I am doubly grateful to Larry Solum for inviting me to present a draft of this paper
before his advanced constitutional law colloquium at Georgetown Law School and to the students in his
course for their outstanding feedback. I also thank the faculty who attended the Georgetown colloquium
for their excellent questions and comments, and the student editors of the Georgetown Law Journal for
their terrific work. Finally, I thank Susanna Blumenthal and Barbara Welke for tremendously helpful
discussions over the past few years about originalism and the discipline of history.
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INTRODUCTION
During oral arguments in the same-sex marriage case Hollingsworth v. Perry,
Justice Scalia asked plaintiffs’ attorney Ted Olson to pinpoint the date at which
“it [became] unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples from marriage.”1
Justice Scalia implored, “how am I supposed to know how to decide a case . . . if
you can’t give me a date when the Constitution changes?”2 The question
appeared to be meant as a “gotcha” of sorts, designed to spotlight the absurdity
of the notion that the same constitutional text might apply differently at
different points in time. It implicitly channeled a long-standing caricature of
constitutional arguments that do not purport to follow automatically from text
and history. The caricature is that such arguments are explicable solely by
result-orientation, bearing little, if any, relationship to the Constitution’s text or
original meaning. The flip side of that depiction is the view that originalism
provides the only principled, value-neutral criteria to find and effectuate constitu-
tional meaning. As Justice Scalia and his coauthor Bryan Garner put it in a
recent book: “Originalism is not perfect. But it is more certain than any other
criterion. And this is not even a close question.”3
The well-known claim that originalism is a uniquely principled interpretive
method comprises two smaller premises. The first, which I call the “reliability
premise,” is that originalism enables one to determine the meaning of constitu-
tional provisions accurately and without bias by drawing upon objective seman-
tic and historical information. The second, which I call the “determinacy
premise,” is that originalism suffices, on its own, to resolve most constitutional
questions. It thus leaves little room for interpreters to inject their own values
into the decision-making process.
Although critics have always challenged the reliability premise,4 the determi-
nacy premise long was taken as a given by originalism’s friends and foes alike.5
Such acceptance was usually warranted, because originalism has traditionally
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144).
2. Id. at 39–40.
3. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 402
(2012).
4. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 248 (2009)
(citing early “savage criticism” of originalism and observing that it “focus[ed] most prominently on two
fundamental weaknesses” of originalism in its earliest form, which entailed the search for original
framing intentions: “First, it is nearly impossible to ascertain a single collective intent . . . [and s]econd,
original intention is a self-defeating philosophy, insofar as much of the historical evidence suggests the
Framers” did not themselves endorse original intentions originalism).
5. That is, critics acknowledged that originalism produced answers to constitutional questions that
originalists deemed singularly accurate, and that it was determinate in that sense. What critics
challenged was whether those answers indeed were correct. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice
of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 714 (2011) (citing coexistence, in originalism’s early days, of
originalism’s “promise of judicial constraint” with “theoretical flaws” identified by critics); Paul Brest,
The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 222–23 (1980)
(acknowledging that “strict intentional[ists]” purport simply “to determine how the adopters would
have applied a provision to a given situation, and to apply it accordingly,” but questioning the historical
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exhibited a bias toward determinacy. To understand how this bias works,
consider again Justice Scalia’s oral argument query. It was grounded partly in
the notion that the Equal Protection Clause’s meaning has remained static since
its framing in 1868—that is, its original meaning is its current meaning. More
significant is the query’s other underlying assumption, one about the meaning of
“meaning.”6 Justice Scalia’s query assumes that the original meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause tells us not only how to define its words, but also how
to apply them to specific cases. Hence, if “the equal protection of the laws”7 did
not encompass same-sex marriage equality in 1868, it does not do so today.
Indeed, Justice Scalia recently made the point explicit in his dissent in Oberge-
fell v. Hodges, the 2015 decision holding that same-sex marriage bans violate
the Constitution.8 There, he explained that “[w]hen the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified in 1868, every State limited marriage to one man and one woman,
and no one doubted the constitutionality of doing so. That resolves these
cases.”9
This traditional, determinate approach to originalism remains deeply influen-
tial and retains much political appeal. Yet in what is perhaps the most important
development in originalism over the last several years, the determinacy premise
no longer goes unchallenged. “New originalists”10 argue that the original
meanings of some constitutional terms are thin rather than thick; that is, the
terms’ original meanings do not include enough information, on their own, to
resolve many constitutional questions. New originalists urge a distinction be-
tween “interpretation” and “construction.” They deem interpretation to occur
when the original semantic meaning of the text is discerned—when courts
determine, for example, the original definition of the term “equal protection of
the laws” as it appears in the Fourteenth Amendment. Once the text runs out,
that is, once it ceases to tell us precisely what to do—either because it encodes a
standard or principle subject to multiple applications, or because it establishes a
thin rule and beyond that is silent—originalist interpretation can do no more
work. At that point, adjudicators must rely on tools of construction that entail
legitimacy of the approach). For friends of originalism, of course, both reliability and determinacy were
trumpeted as features of originalism. See infra Part I.A.
6. For discussions of the different meanings of “meaning” in the context of originalism, see Jack M.
Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 647 (2013); Lawrence
B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 940–41 (2009).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2628 (2015).
9. Id. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10. As Lawrence Solum points out, “[t]he phrase ‘the New Originalism’ could be used in a variety of
ways.” Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453,
456–57 (2013). Indeed, in a recent book I use the term to refer to public meaning originalism as a
whole, as opposed to actual understandings originalism. See HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY: TRANSPARENCY, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (2015). In this Article, however, to
comport with an emphasis on the interpretation–construction distinction, I use the term in the same way
that Solum uses it in the article just cited; that is, to denote public meaning originalist theories that
embrace the interpretation-construction distinction. See Solum, supra, at 457.
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acts of judgment beyond discovering original semantic meanings. In the “con-
struction zone,” adjudicators candidly acknowledge that there is no single
correct answer to be gleaned from constitutional text and history.11 They may, in
this zone, review the relevant constitutional principles and grapple with how
best to apply them to the facts at hand. They also may consider arguments based
on normative considerations.12
For example, Jack Balkin famously argues from a new originalist perspective
that the Equal Protection Clause’s original meaning embodies a principle of
“equality before the law.”13 Applications of that principle are delegated to future
generations to resolve through acts of construction.14 From this vantage point,
the Equal Protection Clause’s original meaning can encompass same-sex mar-
riage equality, even if no one would have dreamt of this construction in 1868.15
The construction depends not on the Clause’s meaning having changed, but on
its original meaning applying to new circumstances—specifically, to evolved
understandings of same-sex relationships.16 Balkin argues that in reasoning
otherwise, Justice Scalia mistakes the Clause’s original expected applications
for its original semantic meaning and, in so doing, artificially thickens the
Clause’s original meaning.17
Most recently, Balkin and others directed such reasoning toward urging the
Supreme Court to strike down same-sex marriage bans in Obergefell. For
example, Professor William Eskridge, the Cato Institute’s Ilya Shapiro, and
Professor Steven Calabresi coauthored an amicus brief (the Cato brief), arguing
that the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is a prohibition on
caste legislation.18 The history surrounding same-sex marriage bans makes
clear, they explain, that such bans constitute caste legislation.19 The bans are
thus unconstitutional, regardless of whether the Clause’s framers or ratifiers
11. See Solum, supra note 10, at 458.
12. Id. at 473.
13. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 220–55 (2011).
14. See, e.g., id. at 222 (explaining that some original constructions of the Equal Protection Clause
“are not reasonable today and we do not have to accept them”).
15. See id. at 267 (explaining that the constitutional “principle against class legislation protects
homosexuals from discrimination even if nobody knew there were such things as homosexuals in 1868,
or, if they knew what homosexuals were, would have opposed the extension of the principle to that
social group”); see also Francis Wilkinson, Originalism, Scalia, and Gay Marriage: An Interview with
Jack Balkin, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Mar. 26, 2013, 10:05 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-
03-26/originalism-scalia-and-gay-marriage-an-interview-with-jack-balkin (quoting Balkin as making a
similar point in response to a question about originalism and same-sex marriage).
16. See BALKIN, supra note 13, at 267 (explaining that “[o]ne does not need a ‘new’ principle” to
protect same-sex rights; one need only to apply an existing constitutional principle “to present-day
circumstances given present-day understandings”).
17. See id. at 7 (criticizing Justice Scalia for conflating original meaning with original expected
applications); Wilkinson, supra note 15 (quoting Balkin explaining the reasoning that Justice Scalia
might apply to same-sex marriage cases and disagreeing with that reasoning).
18. Brief for Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, 15–17, Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, -562, -571, -574).
19. Id. at 17–18, 23, 32.
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could have imagined such an outcome.20 Although the Cato brief does not
explicitly mention construction, its debt to that concept and to new originalism
is plain: it relies on the notion that the Equal Protection Clause’s original
meaning is too thin to embody all potential applications. Instead, the Clause
establishes a principle to be filled out through acts of construction—that is, by
applying the principle to new factual understandings.21
The Obergefell majority itself, while relying predominantly on the Due
Process Clause22 and not referencing construction directly, effectively embraces
the new originalist notion that some original meanings are thin and must be
filled out over time. Justice Kennedy writes for the majority that:
The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its
dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting
the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new
insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a
received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.23
New originalism makes two remarkably important contributions: first, it
illuminates that some constitutional terms are too thin to fully resolve all
constitutional questions, and second, it introduces construction as a tool to fill
out thin meanings.
Yet new originalism’s break from determinacy is not clean enough. Although
proponents acknowledge the absence of single “correct” answers in the zone of
construction, they give short shrift to the epistemic uncertainties also intrinsic in
the interpretation zone. Indeed, as several critics have pointed out, a fundamen-
tal problem with much originalist work is its insistence on discerning single
correct definitions for constitutional provisions, even though many provisions’
meanings were deeply contested at the time of the founding. New originalists
assume that a single original meaning can be isolated for each constitutional
provision, even as they acknowledge that some of those meanings are too thin
to resolve all constitutional questions. With respect to the Equal Protection
Clause, for example, it is not clear from the evidence Balkin cites that a thin,
20. Id. at 3–4.
21. Indeed, Balkin deemed the Cato brief “closest to [his] own position in Living Originalism.” Jack
M. Balkin, Living Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, BALKINIZATION (April 7, 2015, 5:42 PM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/04/living-originalism-and-same-sex-marriage.html.
22. The bulk of the Obergefell opinion focuses on the Due Process Clause and, particularly, on the
meaning of the word “liberty” in that clause. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597–2602. The majority also
turns to the Equal Protection Clause, however, arguing that “[t]he right of same-sex couples to marry
that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amend-
ment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.” Id. at 2602.
23. Id. at 2598. The Obergefell majority makes a similar point about equality, explaining that “in
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has recognized that new insights and societal
understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that once
passed unnoticed and unchallenged.” Id. at 2603.
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open-ended equality principle is the sole plausible original meaning.24 Simi-
larly, the evidence cited in the Cato brief plausibly is consistent with anticaste
principles of varying thickness.25
New originalists also under-theorize the content of the construction zone.
Little light has been shed, for instance, on how to prioritize between different
tools of construction. Furthermore, in keeping with their own brand of determi-
nacy, new originalists fail to recognize the salutary role that construction can
play in response to epistemic uncertainty in the interpretation phase itself.
This Article makes an “all the way down” critique of originalist determinacy.
It challenges originalism’s ability not only to answer all constitutional questions
(for example, whether particular statutes are unconstitutional) through interpreta-
tion, but also to settle reliably on single original meanings, rather than multiple
plausible meanings of constitutional provisions in the first place. As such, it
critiques determinacy in old and new originalisms alike. This Article also
proposes to build on two of new originalism’s tools—its acknowledgment and
embrace of thin original meanings and its use of construction—and to build on
historicist critiques of originalism to create a new approach to epistemic uncer-
tainty in constitutional interpretation. The approach is called “interpretive
modesty.”
Interpretive modesty consists of three steps. First, in the interpretation zone,
interpreters should heed cautionary notes that critics have sounded with respect
to the major forms of originalism, including new originalism. Roughly speak-
ing, this amounts to rejecting the dichotomy drawn in most originalist work
between “public meaning” and what I call “actual understandings.” Instead,
interpreters should draw both on evidence of actual understandings to avoid
straying from historical reality, and on wider evidence of word usage and other
relevant context to avoid the tunnel vision that may follow from relying solely
24. See infra notes 155–58 and accompanying text.
25. This may be most evident if we consider the implications of the anticaste principles on
laws—such as public school financing schemes that lock poor children into relatively underfunded
school systems—that entrench socioeconomic hierarchies. If we look at one important aspect of the
anticaste principle described in the Cato brief—namely, a desire to enable members of future genera-
tions to rise or fall on their own merits, without being stymied by state measures that turn on the
circumstances of their births—that principle should raise grave doubts about such state financing
schemes, regardless of their purposes. Cf. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973) (addressing, and rejecting over dissents, an equal protection challenge to Texas’ property
tax-based financing scheme for public schools). On the other hand, much of the Cato brief’s discussion
lends itself to a somewhat thicker principle, one directed solely against policies that facially or
intentionally single out particular groups for differential treatment. The thicker principle may simply
have no bearing on a financing scheme that is neither facially discriminatory nor provably intentionally
discriminatory, however caste-perpetuating its impact. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
(holding that a city job requirement with a racially discriminatory effect was not a racial classification
where plaintiffs did not show that the law was facially or intentionally discriminatory). Note, not
incidentally, that these examples do not entail applying a single textual principle to facts, but rather
debating the meaning of that principle. At the same time, the examples reflect the sometimes-fine line
between defining and applying textual principles.
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on particular persons’ reported understandings. Interpreters also must remain
mindful of the historical reality that many constitutional provisions—and in-
deed the meaning of constitutionalism itself—remained contested throughout
and in the aftermath of framing and ratification. Interpreters ought not, in short,
begin with the assumption that they can and must discern one correct (or even
best) original semantic meaning. Rather, interpreters should discern and acknowl-
edge all historically plausible original meanings of particular constitutional
provisions.
This brings us to interpretive modesty’s second and most radical step. Where
more than one historically plausible meaning exists, interpreters should refrain
from deeming one the “best” and therefore synonymous with the text itself.
Given the fact of contested plausible meanings, anointing one the interpretive
winner places a false veneer of certainty over an exercise that is inevitably
somewhat ad hoc. Instead, to the extent that the contested meanings contain
some common denominator, only that consistent thread should be deemed
“locked in” as a matter of interpretation. This effectively means that only the
thinnest strand of the plausible contested meanings should be deemed interpre-
tively settled. Consider a situation in which one plausible contested meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause is an abstract principle and other plausible con-
tested meanings are thicker versions of that principle (or expected applications
of that principle). In that case, only the thinnest version of the principle—the
common denominator—should be deemed locked into the constitutional text.
Similarly, there is agreement that the President is meant, under Article II, to
supervise the carrying out of the legislature’s laws, but disagreement over
whether and how far his power extends beyond that point. Again, only the
meaning on which there is agreement should be deemed locked in as a matter of
interpretation. Alternatively, should a case arise in which there are multiple
plausible meanings that lack a common core, interpreters should simply identify
the contested meanings and leave the choice between them to the construction
zone. Such a case would exist, for instance, if a provision’s plausible meanings
included competing principles that do not share a common core.
In the third step, we see the basis for and benefits of the second. The third
step is construction. Here, partisans for meanings that go beyond the thin
common denominator meaning adopted at step two (or for one among plausible
contested meanings that lack a common core) can argue that their meaning
should be adopted as a matter of construction because it best vindicates the
principles and purposes underlying the relevant constitutional provision or
provisions. For example, if an abstract equality principle were adopted at step
two as the thinnest, common-denominator meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause, partisans could argue in step three as to whether that principle demands
heightened protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation. Or if
the rule that the President retains at least supervisory power over the execution
of federal laws were adopted at step two, but an unfettered presidential power to
dismiss executive officials at will were not, partisans could still argue at step
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three that the twin goals of presidential energy and accountability underlying
Article II demand unfettered power in some or all cases.
Adopting only common-denominator meanings (or simply identifying plau-
sible contested meanings where there is no common core of meaning) at the
interpretation phase and hashing out the remaining contested meanings through
construction has both epistemic and normative advantages. Two of these advan-
tages mark improvements over old and new originalism alike because they stem
from interpretive modesty’s rejection of the interpretive overconfidence that
plagues both forms of originalism. First, to the extent that one is committed to
discerning original meanings as accurately as possible, it is counterproductive to
overlook or minimize the complex reality of multiple plausible meanings where
they exist. It is more conducive to precision to supplement semantic ambiguity
by examining and applying underlying constitutional principles and purposes,
rather than locking in one plausible definition over others as semantically
correct. Second, as a normative matter, the relative candor of interpretive
modesty—both in acknowledging the limits of interpretation and in facilitating
open debate as to constitutional principles and their applications in the construc-
tion zone—has the potential to advance our constitutional culture. Indeed, it
may lessen public cynicism about the perceived disingenuousness of constitu-
tional reasoning were judges and other interpreters to acknowledge and grapple
openly with areas of definitional uncertainty, and also to explain the bounded
nature of their discretion. Such reasoning may well seem more plausible and
accessible than confident pronouncements of certainty on matters that appear
both logically contestable and suspiciously in line with interpreters’ known
political leanings.
Three additional features mark advantages of both interpretive modesty and
new originalism over old originalism. First, interpretive modesty has the norma-
tive advantages of which Professor Balkin writes when he champions the
interpretive adoption of principles embedded in text over relatively thick ex-
pected applications of the same. That is, interpretive modesty enhances constitu-
tional legitimacy for present and future generations, connecting us to the past
through original meaning and original principles, while giving us a role in the
constitutional present and future in debating the application of those principles
to modern conditions.26 Second, in widening the construction zone, interpretive
modesty makes room for candid consideration of other constitutionally and
normatively important factors beyond the principles underlying the relevant
provisions. In the construction zone, for example, a court can consider whether
it is most prudent for the political branches, or instead for the court itself, to
resolve the remaining questions of construction. Alternatively, political actors
engaging in interpretation and construction might conclude that a provision’s
original meaning gives them leeway to take a particular action, but that constitu-
tional principles or prudential factors counsel against it. Third, distinguishing
26. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 13, at 60, 84–85, 130.
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between interpretation and construction can play an educative role, illuminating
that much constitutional decision making falls into a middle ground that is
neither unconstrained nor dictated solely by constitutional text.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background
on the law and politics of originalism and its relationship to determinacy. Part II
takes a closer look at determinacy in both old and new originalisms. It critiques
determinacy’s traditional manifestation among “old originalists” as a bias to-
ward thick original meanings. It also assesses the value and the shortcomings of
new originalism’s more limited form of determinacy—its bias toward thin
meanings. Part III elaborates on interpretive modesty as an alternative to old
and new originalisms alike. Parts II and III draw from examples including the
Equal Protection Clause, the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause and the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. Part IV considers
determinacy and interpretive modesty as they relate to debates over Article II of
the Constitution, particularly to the theory of the unitary executive. This ex-
ample provides a useful contrast to those explored in Parts II and III. Determina-
cy’s impact on interpretations of Article II’s vesting of executive power in the
President is less intuitively clear than its impact on interpretations of principles
and standards. Perhaps for this reason, determinacy has been little discussed in
relation to Article II.27 The unitary executive example thus demonstrates how
determinacy manifests itself outside of the realm of principles and standards. It
also further illustrates the problems posed by determinacy and the advantages of
interpretive modesty.
I. ORIGINALISM’S POLITICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL TRAJECTORY AND THE
ROLE OF DETERMINACY
The claims that originalism is uniquely principled, and that alternative theo-
ries offer little more than result orientation, have long been central to its appeal.
The determinacy premise, with its promise that originalism alone can resolve
most constitutional questions, is closely linked to these claims. Yet determina-
cy’s relationship to originalism is not entirely straightforward. In particular, new
originalists, with their embrace of thin constitutional meanings and construc-
tion, partly detach originalism from determinacy.
27. The literature does contain some passing commentary relating to the issue. See, e.g., Keith E.
Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 123–24 (2010)
(deeming the presidential removal power “arguably” a “constitutional gap” that original meaning alone
cannot resolve); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 257 (2001) (arguing in support of their reading of the constitutional
allocation of foreign affairs powers that “every competing theory believes that the Constitution’s text
fails to address many key issues of foreign affairs power”). For a more extended discussion, see
Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1189, 1226–29 (2012) (arguing that
“originalism offers a workable and distinctive approach to constitutional adjudication only if it . . . re-
duc[es] the interpretive leeway claimed by nonoriginalists,” and criticizing public-meaning originalists
for failing to achieve this end with respect to the President’s removal power).
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Section A summarizes originalism’s relatively static relationship to determi-
nacy in public discourse. Sections B, C, and D explore the more complicated
state of originalism in academia and in some judicial statements. Section B
summarizes originalism’s changing definitions in academic and judicial realms
over the past few decades. Section C introduces determinacy’s respective
relationships to old and new originalism in these realms. Section D discusses
historicist critiques of determinacy in old and new originalism alike.
A. ORIGINALISM’S STATIC IMAGE IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE
When originalism first arose as a cohesive school of thought in the 1970s and
1980s, it was championed as a corrective to the unprincipled decisions of the
Warren and Burger Courts. At the 1971 Senate hearing on his nomination to the
Supreme Court, then-Judge Rehnquist promised not to “disregard the intent of
the [F]ramers of the Constitution and change it to achieve a result that [he]
thought might be desirable for society.”28 And in an influential article published
that same year, Robert Bork argued that the framers’ intended applications of
constitutional text should govern in cases where those intentions are knowable.
This plea was part of Bork’s larger call to judges to apply “neutral principles” in
constitutional cases, an approach that he contrasted with the “value-choosing
role of the Warren Court.”29
Although these early claims took place in the rarified settings of congressio-
nal hearings, academic journals, and writings and speeches to elite groups, they
eventually trickled into the realm of public debate. Some trickling was inevi-
table given the intrinsically political forums, particularly congressional hear-
ings, in which some early claims were made. This inevitability was bolstered by
the early claims’ focus on politically explosive social issues, including abortion
and school desegregation. The trickling also was aided by a deliberate campaign
by members of the conservative legal movement to gain acceptance for their
views within the legal and political mainstreams and among the public.30 Within
the Reagan Administration in particular, advancing originalism was part of a
larger project to reset the parameters of constitutional analysis in politics and
28. Colby, supra note 5, at 716 (alterations in original) (quoting Nominations of William H.
Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 19
(1971) (question from Sen. John L. McClellan to William H. Rehnquist)).
29. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 1–4
(1971) (contrasting neutral principles-based approach with Warren Court activism); see also id. at 13
(noting that the “words [of the Equal Protection Clause] are general but surely that would not permit us
to escape the framers’ intent [on how to apply the Clause] if it were clear”).
30. See, e.g., Steven M. Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy: Reagan’s Lawyers and the Dynamics of
Political Investment, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61, 75–82 (2009) (describing the “originalism project” of
the Meese Justice Department); Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 659–61, 680–82
(2009) (noting the “deliberate effort by the Reagan Justice Department” to advance originalism among
the public); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 549, 554–58, 561 (2006) (tracing the “political practice of
originalism” to the 1980s and describing the Reagan Administration’s important role in the same).
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courts for the long term. The Reagan Justice Department, particularly during the
term of Reagan’s second Attorney General, Edwin Meese, became a think tank
of sorts for developing conservative legal ideas and a forum for conveying those
ideas to the wider legal community and the public at large. Of the ideas
developed and conveyed, none were more central than originalism.31
Like other proponents of originalism, the Reagan Justice Department argued
that there was no principled alternative means to interpret the Constitution. For
instance, speaking at a Federalist Society convention in 1987, Attorney General
Meese distinguished originalism from the view of “certain judges, politicians,
and academics today . . . [that] the United States Constitution [is] a document
virtually without legally significant, discernible meaning.”32 To these nonorigi-
nalists, the Constitution “merely provides a starting point for philosophical
adventurism.”33
In depicting originalism as uniquely principled, Meese leaned implicitly on
the determinacy premise. In his 1987 speech to the Federalist Society, for
example, he asked rhetorically, how might “we know when a judge is acting
properly in declaring an executive or legislative act unconstitutional?”34 Answer-
ing his own question, he posited that we need only “look[] at the relevant
written constitutional provision and check[] to see if it is being enforced
according to its plain words as originally understood.”35 Similarly, in a 1985
speech, Meese promised that his Justice Department would “endeavor to resur-
rect the original meaning of constitutional provisions and statutes as the only
reliable guide for judgment.”36
Among academics and some jurists, originalism has undergone much rethink-
ing since these early days. The most well-known change among many original-
ists is the shift from reliance on actual original understandings to an emphasis
on original public meaning; that is, the meaning that “the words and phrases of
the [constitutional] text . . . would have had at the time they were adopted as
law, within the political and linguistic community that adopted the text as
31. See, e.g., Teles, supra note 30, at 62–63, 75–81.
32. Edwin Meese III, U.S. Att’y Gen., Address at the Federalist Society (Jan. 30, 1987), in Edwin
Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 5, 5 (1988).
33. Id. at 6; see also Colby, supra note 5, at 717 (“It would be difficult to overstate the extent to
which the Old Originalism was characterized by its own proponents as a theory that could constrain
judges and preclude them from reading their own policy preferences . . . into the Constitution.”).
34. Meese, supra note 32, at 10.
35. Id.
36. Edwin Meese III, U.S. Att’y Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985)
(transcript available at http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/the-great-debate-attorney-general-ed-
meese-iii-july-9-1985) (emphasis added); see also Teles, supra note 30, at 75–79 (explaining that the
Department’s “originalism project” started as a series of speeches, of which the ABA speech was the
first); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 13 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers
Series, No. 07-24, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract1120244 (observing that the ABA speech
“put originalism on the political agenda”).
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law.”37 Public meaning originalists search for “objective” meaning, or the
meaning that a reasonable founding-era reader would have assigned to the text
in light of the linguistic and other relevant context of the time.38 New original-
ists are a subset of public meaning originalists. New originalists seek out
original public meaning as a matter of interpretation, but turn to construction
when original meaning “runs out.”
In the wake of these shifts in originalism, and particularly in light of new
originalism, a number of legal academics have challenged the long asserted
connections between originalism, reliability, and determinacy. Yet in the realm
of public discourse about these connections, time has stood still. In the public
realm, originalism’s image as a uniquely principled, reliable, and determinate
tool of constitutional analysis remains mostly intact.39
This conception of originalism is partly perpetuated by two of originalism’s
highest profile advocates—Justices Scalia and Thomas. Each regularly depicts
originalism as deeply determinate, even quasi-mechanical in nature. For ex-
ample, Justice Scalia has explained that his adherence to originalism makes it
impossible for him to read his own moral preferences into the Constitution.40
Invoking the example of the death penalty, Scalia wrote that “[f]or [him] . . . the
constitutionality of the death penalty is not a difficult, soul-wrenching question.
It was clearly permitted when the Eighth Amendment was adopted . . . [a]nd so
it is clearly permitted today.”41 Striking a similar note, Justice Thomas has
argued that “[s]trict adherence to [the originalist] approach is essential if we are
to fulfill our constitutionally assigned role of giving full effect to the mandate of
the Framers without infusing the constitutional fabric with our own political
views.”42
37. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1131 (2003).
38. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 92 (2004) (“Whereas ‘original
intent’ originalism seeks the intentions or will of the lawmakers or ratifiers, ‘original meaning’
originalism seeks the public or objective meaning that a reasonable listener would place on the words
used in the constitutional provision at the time of its enactment.”); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The
Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 7 (“[O]riginal meaning represents hypothetical
mental states of a legally constructed reasonable person rather than actual mental states held by
concrete historical persons.”).
39. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009) (describing
originalism’s “tendency to be deployed in the public square—on the campaign trail, on talk radio, in
Senate confirmation hearings, even in Supreme Court opinions—to bolster the popular fable that
constitutional adjudication can be practiced in something close to an objective and mechanical
fashion”); cf. Tara Smith, Originalism’s Misplaced Fidelity: “Original” Meaning is Not Objective, 26
CONST. COMMENT. 1, 1 (2009) (“[I]t is difficult to stray far from the pure, fair-minded appeal of the
Originalist brand of respect for the rule of law.”).
40. See Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours, FIRST THINGS, May 2002, at 17, 17, http://www.
firstthings.com/article/2002/05/gods-justice-and-ours.
41. Id.
42. See Colby & Smith, supra note 4, at 304 (alterations in original) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 367 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
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Such depictions of originalism are echoed and amplified by popular media
figures. For instance, in a December 2005 edition of The Limbaugh Letter, Rush
Limbaugh wrote:
The only antidote to . . . judicial activism is the conservative judicial philoso-
phy known as Originalism. As Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas
explained in a February 2001 speech to the American Enterprise Institute:
“The Constitution means what the delegates of the Philadelphia Convention
and of the state ratifying conventions understood it to mean; not what we
judges think it should mean.” Hallelujah.43
Polling data also suggest that support for originalism coincides with the belief
that it is a relatively mechanical interpretive tool that enables determinacy and
judicial restraint. For example:
A series of polls conducted annually by Quinnipiac University from 2003 to
2008 consistently found that roughly 4 in 10 Americans agreed that “[i]n
making decisions, the Supreme Court should only consider the original inten-
tions of the authors of the Constitution” as opposed to “consider[ing] chang-
ing times and current realities in applying the principles of the Constitution.”44
Analysis by Professors Jamal Greene, Nathanial Persily, and Stephen Ansola-
behere of three sets of surveys sheds additional light on popular associations
between originalism and determinacy.45 Among the traits that the professors
find predictive of originalism is a desire to limit judicial discretion.46 Another
predictive trait is a set of cultural values that include moral traditionalism.47
Although the professors acknowledge that further research is needed to deter-
mine cause and effect, these predictive traits suggest that an important part of
originalism’s popular appeal is the assumption that it drastically narrows judges’
discretion by tying them to the mast of thick meanings as discerned through
founding era intentions. This point is straightforward with respect to the first
trait, a desire to limit judicial discretion.48 With respect to the second trait—
possession of cultural values such as moral traditionalism—the point is nearly
as obvious. If the popular view of originalism is that it ties judges to precise
historical expectations that yield thick meanings—precluding judges, for ex-
43. Rush Limbaugh, Limbaugh Fundamentals: What is Originalism?, LIMBAUGH LETTER, Dec. 5,
2005, at 12, 12 (quoting a February 2001 speech by Justice Thomas to the American Enterprise
Institute) (on file with author).
44. Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11 (2009) (alterations in
original) (emphasis added) (quoting Press Release, Quinnipiac Polling Inst., American Voters Oppose
Same-Sex Marriage Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds, But They Don’t Want Government to
Ban It (July 17, 2008), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x 1284.xml?ReleaseiD1194).
45. Jamal Greene et al., Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 359 (2011).
46. See id. at 371, 385–411.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 387–91.
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ample, from discerning rights to abortion or same-sex marriage in the
Constitution—it follows that originalist judges are unlikely to block legislation
that reflects traditional moral beliefs.49
B. ORIGINALISM’S EVOLVING MEANINGS IN ACADEMIC AND JUDICIAL REALMS
In its early days, originalism was presented in public and scholarly forums
alike as a call to apply the actual intentions of those who framed the Constitu-
tion. This is exemplified by some of the statements from Attorney General
Meese, Justice Rehnquist, and Robert Bork cited in the previous section.50 The
emphasis on framing intent—sometimes broadened to include the intent or
understanding of the document’s ratifiers or even the “original public understand-
ing”51 (hence this Article’s use of the term “actual understandings originalism”
to reference these early methodologies)—eventually gave way, in academic and
some judicial discourse, to a reliance on “original public meaning.”52 Not all
academic and judicial originalists have made the methodological switch. Some
continue to adhere to an actual-understandings-based approach,53 and for others
it is unclear what type or types of originalism they practice.54 Original public
meaning has, however, become the predominant approach to originalism among
those academics and jurists to address the matter directly.55
The switch to public meaning is epitomized by a 1986 speech by Antonin
Scalia, then a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals.56 It was one of many talks
about originalism held at, and sponsored by, the Meese Justice Department.57
Stephen Galebach, who worked in the Department at the time, recounts:
49. See id. at 401. The authors also include libertarianism and comfort with inequality in the cultural
values bundle and suggest similar ties between these views and an originalism steeped in narrow
historical expectations. Id. at 401–02.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 29, 31–35.
51. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 5, at 722–23; Solum, supra note 36, at 15–16.
52. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 5, at 723–24; Solum, supra note 36, at 4–5, 18.
53. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703 (2009) (embracing subjective meaning approach); Larry Alexander,
Simple-Minded Originalism (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Research Paper No. 08-067, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract1235722 (same); see also Solum, supra
note 36, at 2, 5 (summarizing major types of originalism currently followed).
54. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 5, at 771–73 (citing examples of such lack of clarity in the work of
Justice Thomas and others); Colby & Smith, supra note 4, at 300–03 (same). But cf. Solum, supra note
36, at 2, 9 (citing practical overlap between the various originalisms); Solum, supra note 10, at 463–64
(same).
55. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 5, at 739, 749 (“[V]irtually every originalist has come at least a
substantial way down the path from the Old [subjective-intentions-based originalism] to the New
[objective-meaning-based originalism].”); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal
Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48–49 (2006) (“[T]he weight of originalist opinion today supports
the view that the Constitution’s meaning is to be found in the hypothetical mind of the reasonable
person . . . .”).
56. Teles, supra note 30, at 80.
57. Id. at 75.
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[A] lunch we had, maybe 25 or 30 of the political appointees in the depart-
ment, with Nino Scalia. He was then on the DC Circuit, and he gave a talk
against original intent. It was great. His point was, that judges are obligated to
follow the original meaning of constitutional provisions and statutes. The
subjective intent of the framers was irrelevant—it was the words they used as
understood in light of context.58
Kenneth Cribb, who also worked in the Department, added “you could just tell
by osmosis that everyone [in the audience] agreed with that. And so I wrote,
‘stipulated,’ and tacked it up on the podium while he was talking. We used
original meaning more after that.”59
By and large, public meaning originalists purport not to “concern themselves
with how the words of the Constitution were actually understood by the
Framers, the ratifiers, the public, or anyone else, but rather with how a hypotheti-
cal, reasonable person should have understood them.”60 Beyond his or her own
reasonableness, the characteristics of this hypothetical person vary considerably.
For example, whereas Justice Scalia emphasizes the hypothetical reader’s ordi-
nariness, explaining that the original meaning is that which would have “been
known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation,”61 Gary Lawson and
Guy Seidman emphasize the hypothetical reader’s extraordinariness:
This person is highly intelligent and educated and capable of making and
recognizing subtle connections and inferences. This person is committed to
the enterprise of reason, which can provide a common framework for discus-
sion and argumentation. This person is familiar with the peculiar language and
conceptual structure of the law.62
Other public meaning originalists offer further variants; for example, Vasan
Kesavan and Michael Paulsen refer to a “hypothetical, objective, reasonably
well-informed reader . . . within the political and linguistic community in which
[the relevant constitutional words and phrases] were adopted.”63 And Professor
Randy Barnett refers simply to the meaning “that a reasonable listener would
place on the words used in the constitutional provision at the time of its
enactment.”64
Finally, new originalists are a subset of public meaning originalists who draw
a distinction between interpretation and construction.65 They acknowledge that
58. Id. at 80 (quoting interview with Galebach, July 2007).
59. Id. at 81 (quoting interview with Cribb, August 2007).
60. Colby & Smith, supra note 4, at 254–55; see, e.g., sources cited supra note 38.
61. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008).
62. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 55, at 73. But see Kay, supra note 53, at 722 (contrasting this
characterization with Lawson’s own earlier, less elaborate conception of the original reader).
63. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 37, at 1132.
64. BARNETT, supra note 38, at 92.
65. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing different meanings of “new originalism”).
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in some cases the text’s original meaning “runs out,” and that construction
ought to fill the remaining gaps. New originalists make clear that any permis-
sible constructions must be consistent with original meaning. In other words,
although original meaning may not dictate one correct answer to a constitutional
question, it will preclude some answers. The construction zone does not extend
beyond the range of permissible answers.66
C. ORIGINALISM(S) AND DETERMINACY IN LEGAL ACADEMIC LITERATURE
There is a substantial scholarly consensus that actual understandings original-
ism is compatible with determinacy. When actual understandings originalism
was the only game in town, it received scholarly pushback with respect to the
reliability premise and to normative concerns.67 The determinacy premise,
however, typically was taken as a given.68 With the switch to public meaning
originalism, legal scholars have begun to debate whether such an originalism is
compatible with determinacy, and whether indeterminacy is a good or bad
development.69
Richard Kay, who adheres to actual understandings originalism, criticizes the
new originalism as both unreliable and relatively indeterminate. He deems
objective meaning deeply malleable, pointing to the broad range of potential
hypothetical reasonable founding era readers. He observes that a chosen hypo-
thetical reader may well “understand the constitutional language in a way
congenial to the aspirations of whatever interpreter is charged with conjuring up
that reader.”70 Kay also takes the view that an actual understandings approach
can credibly supply much thicker original meanings than can objective original-
ism. The latter, he argues, “allows for multiple plausible interpretations of
constitutional provisions, undermining the critical constitutionalist values of
clarity and certainty in constitutional limits.”71 An actual understandings ap-
proach, on the other hand, offers
more to investigate. . . . [T]here was an intention about [a given provision]
and a raft of information about what that intention might have been. An
interpreter ought to be able to arrive at a “better,” if still uncertain, judgment
about whether the enactors understood themselves to be prohibiting [a particu-
lar] kind of action.72
66. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 38, at 120–23; Solum, supra note 36, at 6–7; Whittington, supra
note 27, at 121.
67. See, e.g., Colby & Smith, supra note 4, at 248 (summarizing “savage criticism” heaped on
original intent originalism).
68. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (explaining the logic by which critics accepted the
determinacy premise but rejected the reliability premise).
69. See Colby, supra note 5, at 744–45 (referencing these scholarly reactions and deeming “objec-
tive meaning originalism” incompatible with determinacy).
70. Kay, supra note 53, at 723.
71. Id. at 719.
72. Id. at 720.
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An actual-understandings-based interpreter thus is best equipped to discover
thick original meanings that resolve constitutional questions, leaving relatively
little room for judicial discretion.73
Others echo Kay’s criticism of the thinness of new originalism’s outputs. Tom
Colby, for example, argues that new originalists have “effectively sacrificed [old
originalism’s] promise of judicial constraint.”74 And Martin Redish and Mat-
thew Arnould consider the determinacy premise so central to originalism’s
legitimacy that they understand new originalists “implicitly [to] concede[] the
failure of the entire originalist enterprise” by acknowledging a role for construc-
tion.75 Indeed, Redish and Arnould deem it “Orwellian to describe [a theory that
leaves room for construction] as ‘originalist’ in any meaningful sense of that
term.”76
The subset of public meaning originalists who are new originalists agree that
the methodology lends itself to interpretive thinness, and celebrate this fact as a
feature rather than a bug. Indeed, Jack Balkin refers to his approach as “frame-
work originalism.”77 He deems the Constitution an initial “framework for
governance” as opposed to a fully formed “skyscraper.”78 The Constitution’s
unfinished, framework-like nature is evidenced partly by the many questions
that the text leaves unaddressed. Although the Constitution consists of some
unequivocal rules (for example, the President must be at least thirty-five years
old), it also relies on a host of standards and principles that cannot mechanically
be applied and that are subject to change in application over time (for example,
directives against unreasonable searches and seizures (a standard) and violations
of equal protection (a principle)).79
Professor Randy Barnett similarly observes that original meaning originalists
are “bound to interpret the text at its original level of generality.”80 Although he
finds relatively thick meanings in some provisions—arguing, for instance, that
the original meaning of the Commerce Clause precludes all but a narrow
reading of the same—he deems other provisions thin.81 He argues, for example,
that the rights “retained by the people” under the Ninth Amendment cannot be
reduced, as a matter of original meaning, to the founders’ expected applications.82
73. Id. at 721 (“[P]ublic meaning originalism will generate more cases of constitutional indetermi-
nacy than will the originalism of original intentions. The discovery of indeterminacies in otherwise
originalist interpretation has been the ‘little gap’ through which a broad range of judicial choice has
been perceived.”).
74. Colby, supra note 5, at 714.
75. Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and the
Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1508
(2012).
76. Id. at 1509.
77. BALKIN, supra note 13, at 3.
78. Id. at 3–4, 14, 21–23.
79. See id. at 6, 14–15.
80. BARNETT, supra note 38, at 258.
81. See generally id.
82. See id. at 256.
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Given the generality of the amendment’s text, its meaning must be filled out
through construction.83 Taken as a whole, Barnett explains, his interpretations
both recover lost original meanings and conduce to candid analyses of constitu-
tional questions not resolvable through interpretation alone.84
Finally, some public meaning originalists acknowledge the potential thinness
of original meanings, but advocate adjudicative approaches that produce determi-
nate answers and obviate the need for construction. For example, Gary Lawson
agrees that an originalist simply “finds whatever one finds,”85 thin or thick. Yet
he concludes that “[a] judge applying reasonable-person originalism will always
be able to decide [a] case for one or another party in a principled and
determinate fashion.”86 The judge must simply filter originalism through appro-
priate burdens of proof. If the party with the burden of proof is unable to prove
that original meaning supports their claim, they lose.87 The burden of proof
should rest with whichever party asserts a constitutional claim. Because the
Constitution is a “grant of certain powers to the federal government and a denial
of certain powers to state governments,” Lawson explains, “In practice . . . advo-
cates of federal power will almost always bear the burden of proof while
opponents of state power will (I think I can safely say) always bear the burden
of proof.”88 Professor Michael Paulsen, too, supports an approach that com-
bines original meaning with a default interpretive rule. Paulsen explains that
“original-meaning textualism [itself] supplies a default rule: where the Constitu-
tion fails to resolve a particular issue, or leaves open a range of meaning or
choice, it is open for popular, representative self-government to act” without
judicial intervention.89
D. ANTIDETERMINACY ALL THE WAY DOWN: HISTORICIST CRITIQUES OF ORIGINALISM
In much of the legal literature, then, particularly among originalist scholars,
debates over determinacy center on the relative thinness or thickness of original
meanings and the use of construction to fill in thin meanings. Historians and
language scholars—as well as a handful of legal scholars writing from historicist90
perspectives—challenge determinacy in a deeper way. These critics suggest that
83. See id. at 255–57.
84. Id. at 353.
85. Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism and the
Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551, 1560–61 (2012).
86. Id. at 1563.
87. Id. at 1564; see also Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 411, 423–24 (1996).
88. Lawson, supra note 85, at 1564–65 (emphasis omitted); see also Lawson, supra note 87, at
425–28.
89. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 857, 915 (2009).
90. As Stephen Griffin puts it: “A historicist perspective focuses on the contexts in which historical
events took place and how those contexts were later changed.” Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting
Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1205. Such a perspective lends itself to recognizing the fluidity
and politically contested nature of much language, particularly legal language. Cf. Martin S. Flaherty,
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originalism is misguided to the extent that it assumes that there is a single
original meaning, whether thin or thick, for many constitutional provisions in
the first place.
For example, Bernadette Meyler critiques efforts by originalists to identify a
single, settled common law meaning for particular constitutional terms. Meyler
explains that “the common law was far from a unified field at the time of the
Founding, nor was it so conceived, as both the writings of the Founders
themselves and contemporaneous legal commentary demonstrate.”91 Common
law disunity was a function of many factors. For one, the common law was
widely understood as an intrinsically flexible and evolving body.92 Furthermore,
although Justice Scalia and other originalists turn to Blackstone as the primary
source of common law doctrine, this ignores the “temporal disjunction between
the moment of direct importation of the common law into the colonies at the
time of their settlement and Blackstone’s systematic formulation of the British
common law in the middle of the eighteenth century.”93 More so, imported
common law by no means fully mirrored British common law, and common law
doctrines further diverged between the colonies and later the states.94 Accord-
ingly, Meyler concludes that “a single common law answer to a constitutional
question often remains unavailable; instead, several distinct positions may
present themselves.”95
Historians make similar points about constitutional text more broadly. That
is, they argue that originalists err to the extent that they assume the existence of
single, correct meanings for constitutional provisions, including but not limited
to the text’s common law terms. This criticism is perhaps best known as it
relates to actual understandings originalism. For example, Gordon Wood ob-
serves that “historically there can be no real ‘original intention’ behind the
document. Not only were there hundreds of Founders, including the Anti-
Federalists, with a myriad of clashing contradictory intentions, but in the end all
the Founders created something that no one of them ever intended.”96
History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 568 n.209 (1995) (“For
present purposes, a historicist may be defined as one who thinks history is important.”).
91. Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 556 (2006).
92. Id. at 578, 580–82.
93. Id. at 557; see id. at 561 (“Scalia usually looks first to Blackstone and then only subsequently
and minimally elsewhere. Other Justices and judges who do not explicitly adopt an originalist method
likewise tend to rely heavily on Blackstone’s statements about the state of eighteenth-century common
law.”).
94. See id. at 556, 562, 572–80. Similarly, Kurt Lash observes that “[t]he status of the government
and the role of its courts were different on American soil, rendering problematic any wholesale
adoption of Blackstonian common law.” Kurt T. Lash, Originalism All the Way Down?, 30 CONST.
COMMENT. 149, 157 (2015) (reviewing JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND
THE GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013)).
95. Meyler, supra note 91, at 557.
96. Gordon S. Wood, The Fundamentalists and the Constitution, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 18, 1988;
see, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, The Poverty of Public
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Yet historians also have been quick to criticize public meaning originalism.
These critics focus on both the ahistoricism and the inescapable, if ironic,
subjectivity inherent in creating and gleaning insights from a hypothetical,
objective founding-era reader. The latter criticism is shared by some legal
scholars who continue to adhere to actual understandings originalism. For
example, both Richard Kay and Larry Alexander have expressed concerns over
the malleability of hypothetical readers.97 Among historians, Jack Rakove
protests that a hypothetical reader’s “projected understanding of the Constitu-
tion will be cobbled together arbitrarily from some set of sources that true
original readers might not have possessed or used in the way imagined and that
can only be the product of a modern intelligence creating a figure who did not
exist.”98 Saul Cornell similarly charges that public meaning originalists can
“side step dealing with the actual beliefs of Americans and substitute the beliefs
of a fictive reader, effectively turning constitutional interpretation into an act of
historical ventriloquism,” because they “[ignore] the real voices of eighteenth
century Americans.”99
Embedded in these criticisms is the notion that claims of definitive original
public meanings are suspect at best. We saw, for example, Professor Meyler’s
assessment of the competing original meanings of common law terms used in
the Constitution.100 Jack Rakove suggests that the meaning of “constitution”
itself was contested during the founding period.101 He observes:
When one is dealing with a period as politically and intellectually creative as
the Revolutionary era obviously was, one could not possibly understand what
the adopters of the Constitution were doing without reconstructing their
debates in some detail. One would also have to recognize that the use of
political language, like other forms of speech, is necessarily creative, and that
key words develop and acquire new shades of meaning precisely because they
are subjected to the pressures of active controversy.102
Saul Cornell agrees that “[e]arly American history was not characterized by
broad agreement on constitutional matters, but rather was deeply divided on a
Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 583 (2011) (offering a similar criticism of efforts to
discern definitive constitutional meanings through an actual understandings based originalism).
97. See Kay, supra note 53, at 723 (describing this “malleability” as possibly “provid[ing] for
interpretations that may deviate from any plausible estimate of the original intentions” and “produc[ing]
a hypothetical reader who would understand the constitutional language in a way congenial to the
aspirations of whatever interpreter is charged with conjuring up that reader”); Alexander, supra note 53,
at 7–8 (lamenting that academics such as Ronald Dworkin and David A.J. Richards have “hypoth-
esiz[ed] authors” to produce the interpretations they want).
98. Rakove, supra note 96, at 586.
99. Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular Constitutional-
ism and the Original Debate Over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 299, 301 (2011).
100. See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text.
101. See Rakove, supra note 96, at 589–91.
102. Id. at 593.
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variety of fundamental issues about constitutional interpretation and mean-
ing.”103 Similarly, John Howe notes that the “linguistic demands generated by
the rapidly changing circumstances of revolutionary politics . . . eroded . . . con-
fident assumptions” of linguistic fixity.104 Howe elaborates:
As the language of monarchy was replaced by a new republican discourse, as
the task of revolution-making set social and economic interests against one
another, and as the universe of political writers expanded and conflicts over
the control of political discourse increased, language became the object as
well as the instrument of political struggle. In the midst of revolutionary
change, the content, rhetorical purposes, and thus the signification of political
language proved shifting and uncertain.105
Linguistic fluidity and contestation can be expected to reign in any period of
great legal and political change and controversy. The higher the stakes in
defining terms, the greater incentive that parties have to contest their meanings
and that drafters have to foster the “ambiguity [that] enables compromise.”106
For example, Thomas Colby reminds us:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment was, of course, . . . enacted out of a sense of
urgency in a highly political environment. Its rights-bearing clauses were
“little discussed or debated at the time,” and its language was, even then,
recognized to be highly ambiguous and indeterminate. . . . [S]cholars have
suggested that its authors and sponsors—whose remarks are most often
looked to today as proof of its original meaning—may have intentionally
misrepresented its meaning on the floor of the Congress, “endeavoring to
bring a wooden horse into the Constitution” in order to commit “fraud on the
nation.”107
The absence of linguistic fixity does not render the words of the Constitution
meaningless. To the contrary, historical inquiry can establish ranges of plausible
meanings and set boundaries to exclude the implausible. As Jack Rakove writes:
“[i]t is one thing to say that few interpretations of the more ambiguous and
disputable clauses of the Constitution can be established conclusively, another
to treat all interpretations as equally plausible or representative of the prevailing
ideas of the time.”108 Drawing on a similar premise, Professor Meyler offers a
103. Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The Intellec-
tual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 724 (2013).
104. JOHN HOWE, LANGUAGE AND POLITICAL MEANING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 63 (2004).
105. Id.
106. Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of Originalism,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 593 (2008) (quoting Mark Moller, Class Action Lawmaking: An Administra-
tive Law Model, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 39, 91 (2006)).
107. Id.
108. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 10
(1996).
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means to reconcile originalism and historicism as they relate to constitutional
common law terms. She suggests that one could reconceptualize originalism not
as a search for the one correct answer for each constitutional provision, but
rather as a bounded “domain of contested meanings.”109
II. ASSESSING DETERMINACY IN OLD AND NEW ORIGINALISMS
In academic debates, then, determinacy’s relationships to originalism and to
interpretive reliability are considerably more complex and contested than they
are in public discourse. This Part takes a closer look at those relationships. To
facilitate in-depth examination of originalist arguments, this Part focuses on the
work of just a few writers. With respect to new originalism, this Part looks at
Jack Balkin’s work, given its central and prolific presence in debates over thin
versus thick interpretations. With respect to old originalism, this Part looks at
commentary by Justice Scalia and at coauthored work by Professors John
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport. It cites Justice Scalia’s work in light of his
longstanding and influential role as a proponent of a determinate version of
originalism. It examines McGinnis and Rappaport’s work, because they have
written in great detail over the past several years about the relative merits of
originalist determinacy.
Section A contrasts Balkin’s thin principles-based version of new originalism
with the thicker reading of constitutional principles and standards embraced by
Justice Scalia and McGinnis and Rappaport. Section B critiques the bias toward
thick, determinate meanings exhibited by Scalia, McGinnis and Rappaport. To
the extent that this bias relies on the assumption that the founders surely
intended to lock in thick meanings—an argument developed in particular by
McGinnis and Rappaport—it flies in the face of history, text, and logic.
Section B also addresses the argument, recently accorded book-length treat-
ment by McGinnis and Rappaport, that thick answers can and should be derived
through whatever methods the founders would have used to resolve constitu-
tional questions—that is, by adhering to “original methods originalism.” It
observes that McGinnis and Rappaport themselves fail to resolve what original
methods are, concluding only that they entail “some form of originalism.” And
they reach this conclusion only by defining originalist methods so broadly as to
include those more precisely characterized as tools of construction. This reflects
a foundational failing of any approach devoted to resolving constitutional
questions solely through original meaning. That is, such approaches inevitably
wrap discretionary acts of construction in the cloak of objective linguistic
excavation.
Section C looks at an approach biased toward thin meanings, particularly that
developed by Balkin. It applauds his emphasis on construction as a vehicle for
applying principles discerned through interpretation, and thus as a means to
109. Bernadette Meyler, Accepting Contested Meanings, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 803, 806 (2013).
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realize interpretation’s fruits. It also agrees with Balkin on the normative
advantages of thin versus thick constitutional meanings. It further observes that
his assessment of the Constitution as a thin “framework” rather than a thick
“skyscraper” is more in line with historians’ assessments than the alternative.
Yet section C also argues that Balkin is too quick to dismiss evidence of thick
original meanings as historically plausible and to deem their thin alternatives
the sole correct interpretations of particular provisions. A better approach would
be to acknowledge where more than one plausible meaning exists, but explain
why it is most reliable and normatively preferable to lock in only the thinnest,
common core meaning through interpretation, while leaving room for thicker
meanings in the construction phase. Or, where no common core meaning exists,
why it is preferable to only identify the range of plausible original meanings in
the interpretation zone, while choosing between those meanings in the construc-
tion zone.
A. THE EXTANT DEBATE
1. The Thinness Bias
Jack Balkin is the most prolific bearer of a thinness bias in constitutional
interpretation. Much of his analysis hinges on the distinction between provi-
sions’ original public meanings and original expectations as to how those
meanings would apply. Balkin, himself a public meaning originalist, criticizes
other self-identified public meaning originalists for purporting to adhere to
original public meaning while actually conflating public meaning with expected
applications.
For example, Balkin criticizes Justice Scalia’s view of the Eighth Amend-
ment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual” punishments. Justice Scalia long has
argued that the provision’s original meaning cannot possibly demand abolition
of the death penalty, because “capital punishment . . . was widely in use in
1791,”110 and because language elsewhere in the Constitution specifically con-
templates capital punishment’s existence.111 Echoing his challenge to Ted Olson
to identify “when the Constitution change[d]” to encompass a right to same-sex
marriage,112 Justice Scalia chides those who believe that “the death penalty
may,” since the founding, “have become unconstitutional.”113
Balkin builds on an objection to Scalia’s view first made by Ronald Dworkin.
As Dworkin put it:
110. Antonin Scalia, Response, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 129, 145 (1997).
111. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 110, at
3, 46.
112. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 40.
113. Scalia, supra note 111, at 46.
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The framers of the Eighth Amendment laid down a principle forbidding
whatever punishments are cruel and unusual. They did not themselves expect
or intend that that principle would abolish the death penalty, so they provided
that death could be inflicted only after due process. But it does not follow that
the abstract principle they stated does not, contrary to their own expectation,
forbid capital punishment.114
Balkin, too, cites this example to illustrate why “Scalia’s version of ‘original
meaning’ is not original meaning in my sense, but actually a more limited
interpretive principle, what I call original expected application.”115
Balkin’s distinction between original meanings and expected applications is
part of a larger approach that he calls framework originalism. Framework
originalism “views the Constitution as an initial framework for governance that
sets politics in motion, and that Americans must fill out over time through
constitutional construction.”116 The notion that original meanings often are thin
is essential to framework originalism. Indeed, Balkin notes explicitly that
framework originalism has a “‘thin’ theory of original meaning” and that it
“thus leaves most important constitutional controversies in . . . the ‘construction
zone.’”117
Professor Balkin justifies framework originalism partly on normative grounds,
and partly on the basis that it is the most accurate way to read the Constitution.
As a normative matter, he deems framework originalism a stabilizing force
insofar as it best describes and justifies existing constitutional doctrine.118 More
fundamentally, Balkin links framework originalism to the Constitution’s demo-
cratic legitimacy. Constitutions, he posits, “cannot maintain [such] legitimacy
without contributions from multiple generations.”119 Framework originalism
facilitates such contributions. While it anchors the Constitution in tradition and
history through interpretation, it enables current and future generations to
connect it to their experiences through construction.120 For example, Balkin
explains that the Equal Protection Clause, which he reads to embody a broad
equality principle, has been able to accommodate social change and learning.121
Such change and learning are sparked through social movements, as groups
114. Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 110, at 120–21.
115. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 296 (2007)
(emphasis omitted).
116. BALKIN, supra note 13, at 3.
117. Balkin, supra note 6, at 646.
118. See Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 820–21
(explaining that thick originalists, “to maintain political credibility . . . have accepted a wide variety of
precedents and practices they consider inconsistent with original meaning,” whereas “[f]ramework
originalism does not encounter this problem”); Balkin, supra note 6, at 649–50 (explaining that
framework originalism “make[s] much better sense of Americans’ actual practices of constitutional
interpretation” than does thick originalism).
119. Balkin, supra note 118, at 830.
120. See id. at 829–30.
121. See id. at 851–52.
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mobilize to convince the public and elites—including the judiciary—that laws
targeting their members are based on mistaken views of their abilities or
characteristics. For instance, to the framework originalist:
[I]t matters greatly that there was a women’s movement in the 1960s and
1970s that convinced Americans that both married and single women were
entitled to equal rights and that the best way to make sense of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s principle of equal citizenship was to apply it to women as well
as men, despite the original expected application of the adopters.122
Balkin also maintains that framework originalism offers the most accurate
means to interpret the Constitution. In making his case, he relies most heavily
on the text itself, noting that the Constitution’s provisions range from determi-
nate rules to principles and standards.123 Fidelity to the text demands that we
“pay careful attention to the reasons why constitutional designers choose particu-
lar kinds of language.”124 This includes understanding that “[c]onstitutional
drafters use rules because they want to limit discretion; they use standards or
principles because they want to channel politics but delegate the details to
future generations.”125 Framework originalism “ascribes . . . these purposes to
[constitutional] adopters.”126
2. The Thickness Bias
In the academic literature, an interpretive bias toward thickness is most
explicitly defended in a book and a series of articles coauthored by McGinnis
and Rappaport. Their work manifests the thickness bias in three ways. First, the
authors suggest that originalist methods should suffice to answer all or most
constitutional questions, rendering construction unnecessary. More precisely,
McGinnis and Rappaport follow original methods originalism, whereby modern
interpreters should apply the interpretive methods that founding era interpreters
would have used. Although they do not offer detailed conclusions as to what
those methods are, they deem them “broadly originalist in the modern sense of
the term.”127 Most importantly for our purposes, they explain that original
methods obviate the need for construction. At minimum, a best answer to any
122. BALKIN, supra note 13, at 11.
123. See id. at 6.
124. Id. at 6.
125. Id. at 23–24.
126. Balkin, supra note 118, at 830. We see a similar move on the part of the Obergefell majority:
The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did
not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to
future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its
meaning.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
127. JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 133
(2013).
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constitutional question can be discerned through such methods.128 Second,
although McGinnis and Rappaport reject Balkin’s characterization of their work
as embracing expected applications originalism, they deem “expected applica-
tions . . . strong,” though not dispositive “evidence of the original meaning.”129
They elaborate that “while the original meaning may not be defined by the
expected applications, these applications will often be some of the best evi-
dence of what that meaning is.”130 More broadly, they conclude that “if there is
uncertainty about whether [a] constitutional provision has a meaning congenial
to the living constitution approach or whether it has a more constrained mean-
ing, one should interpret it to have the more constrained meaning.”131
Third, McGinnis and Rappaport’s positive and normative views about
originalism—that is, their conclusions that the founders embraced originalism
and that it leads to good consequences—are tightly intertwined with the premise
that originalism yields thick meanings. Normatively, the authors tie original-
ism’s virtues to the constitutional ratification process. They explain that the
supermajority votes required to ratify the Constitution and its amendments are
likely to generate good substantive results. Only originalism—which adheres to
the original meaning, and hence to the substantive bargains struck by superma-
jorities when they ratified the Constitution’s provisions—captures these good
results. Yet for originalism to produce good results, the original meanings that it
yields must be thick. Otherwise, originalism leaves space to be filled through
construction by judges or through ordinary, rather than supermajority-driven
politics. Indeed, McGinnis and Rappaport make explicit their view that a
constitution filled with thinly defined principles and standards is normatively
undesirable. They explain that “[c]onstitutions have been traditionally under-
stood as placing limits on the actions that ordinary governmental majorities can
take. . . . But if constitutions have abstract meanings that allow ordinary govern-
ment, including the courts, to alter their meaning over time, then the Constitu-
tion will no longer serve this function.”132
McGinnis and Rappaport’s normative views are closely linked to their histori-
cal understandings. They repeatedly invoke the assumption that the founders
would have wished to anchor their choices as firmly as possible. As such, the
founders would have favored provisions that would be interpreted thickly,
leaving little discretion for future decision makers to veer from founding
directives. Pointing to studies showing risk aversion among financial investors,
McGinnis and Rappaport extrapolate that “citizens are risk-averse when it
128. See id. at 139–43, 150; see also John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract
Meaning Fallacy, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737, 751–52.
129. John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of
Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 371 (2007).
130. Id. at 378 (emphasis added); see also id. at 380; MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 127, at 118.
131. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 128, at 762.
132. Id. at 766–67.
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comes to constitutional provisions.”133 As such, “[s]upermajority rules are
unlikely to lead to constitutional delegations to the future” through thin provi-
sions.134 McGinnis and Rappaport link their historical assumptions to their
conclusion that provisions’ original expected applications are substantial, if not
conclusive, evidence of their meanings.135 They explain that “discarding ex-
pected applications in favor of abstract principles . . . transfers tremendous power
from the enactors of the Constitution to future interpreters. A Constitution that
was established to place limits on future government actors would not delegate
power so generously.”136
McGinnis and Rappaport also bolster their historical assumptions with the
more directly positive claim that founding era “interpretive rules were essen-
tially originalist.”137 Although they acknowledged that “[n]othing guarantees”
which, if any “of the prevailing modern approaches to originalism” were
utilized, they conclude that “some form of originalism . . . is the correct ap-
proach.”138 To support this claim, they cite to several early American and
English statements to the effect that written laws, whether statutes or constitu-
tions, should be interpreted through methods designed to ferret out original
meaning. These methods typically were textualist or intentionalist in nature, or
some combination of the two.139
While McGinnis and Rappaport offer the most detailed academic case for a
thickness bias, the most widely known proponent of the bias is Justice Scalia.
Like McGinnis and Rappaport, Justice Scalia deems the distinction between
original meaning and expected applications a false dichotomy. For example,
Justice Scalia argues:
[T]he Eighth Amendment is no mere “concrete and dated rule” but rather an
abstract principle. . . . What it abstracts, however, is not a moral principle of
“cruelty” that philosophers can play with in the future, but rather the existing
society’s assessment of what is cruel. . . . [O]therwise, it would be no protec-
tion against the moral perceptions of a future, more brutal, generation. It is, in
other words, rooted in the moral perceptions of the time.
133. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 127, at 148–49, 259 nn.38–39. On the financial risk
aversion analogy, McGinnis and Rappaport note that “[t]here are studies of risk aversion in finance,
showing that the overwhelming majority of people are risk-averse in regard to financial investments.
[Jack] Balkin has provided no reason to believe that they would feel otherwise in political investments,
like a constitution.” Id. at 259 n.38 (internal citation omitted). They add, with respect to the high stakes
of constitutional ratification, that “[a]gain there is an analogy to finance: the more equity is at risk, the
more risk-averse management will be.” Id. at 259 n.39 (internal citation omitted).
134. Id. at 148; see also id. at 81–83; McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 129, at 372–73, 378,
380–81.
135. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 128, at 772.
136. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 129, at 378.
137. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 127, at 117.
138. Id. at 133.
139. Id. at 135.
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On this analysis, it is entirely clear that capital punishment, which was
widely in use in 1791, does not violate the abstract moral principle of the
Eighth Amendment.140
As with McGinnis and Rappaport, Justice Scalia’s gravitation to thick, expec-
tations-based meanings is grounded in a normative embrace of constitutional
anchoring, and a rejection of the alternatives. Justice Scalia expresses the view
that thickly defined provisions are safer for liberty than are provisions that are
defined so thinly as to invite interpretive mischief in current and future genera-
tions. It is in this vein that Justice Scalia famously refers to originalism—an
originalism plainly underscored by the determinacy premise—as “the lesser
evil.”141
B. THE TROUBLE WITH THE THICKNESS BIAS
The deepest flaw that the thickness bias manifests is epistemic overconfi-
dence, or overconfidence in the abilities of modern interpreters to discern a
single correct or even best original meaning for any constitutional provision.
McGinnis and Rappaport exhibit such sanguinity in writing:
Under an original public meaning analysis that focuses on how a reason-
able, well-informed reader would understand the language of a clause, lan-
guage is ordinarily, if not always, reasonably understood as having a single
meaning. In some cases, this language will have a clear meaning. In other
cases, it may be ambiguous or vague, but there are various tools in the
interpretive rules, such as history, structure, and purpose, that can be em-
ployed to resolve uncertainty as to the single meaning of a provision.142
To put a finer point on it, they explain that even extremely close cases,
“where the evidence just slightly favors one interpretation (what we call a
51%–49% situation)” over another, can be resolved by selecting “the stronger
interpretation.”143
140. Scalia, supra note 110, at 145. As this example suggests, it is not clear that there is any
daylight, in practice, between expected applications and Justice Scalia’s view of original meaning. See,
e.g., Greene, supra note 30, at 663 (“[I]n practice, Justice Scalia’s originalism does not allow
constitutional interpretations to prohibit what was permitted at the time of the relevant clause’s
enactment.”).
141. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 855–56, 863–64
(1989); see also supra text accompanying note 137; cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2618
(2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[G]iven the few ‘guideposts for responsible decisionmaking [in the
substantive due process realm],’ ‘an approach grounded in history imposes limits on the judiciary that
are more meaningful than any based on [an] abstract formula.’” (third alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (first quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992); and then quoting Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 n.12 (1977)).
142. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 128, at 751–52.
143. Mike Rappaport & John McGinnis, Clarifying Originalism: A Response to Randy Barnett,
ORIGINALISM BLOG (Feb. 27, 2014, 11:06 AM), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/
2014/02/clarifying-originalism-a-response-to-randy-barnettmike-rappaport-john-mcginnis.html.
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The first and most obvious problem with this view is its conflict with the
substantial evidence collected by historians and scholars of language to the
effect that much language, particularly political and legal language, tends to
be deeply in flux during times of great political and legal change, including the
founding. Given this backdrop, efforts to lock in a single thick original meaning
for each disputed constitutional provision elevate the veneer of certainty over
candor and accuracy. Second, the notion that one can discern precisely the
“best” interpretation from multiple plausible ones assumes a capacity to quan-
tify historical and linguistic evidence that flies in the face of interpretive
experience. Originalists disagree widely among themselves even as to the
evidence and methodology by which original meaning is discerned, let alone as
to substantive interpretative conclusions. There is no indication in the copious
judicial, scholarly, and political disputes over original meanings that the eviden-
tiary support for such meanings can be quantified and ranked. McGinnis and
Rappaport themselves offer little commitment to particular original methods
beyond those embodying “some form of originalism.”144
Indeed, the very evidence that McGinnis and Rappaport cite to demonstrate
that original methods encompass originalism reveals the imprecision and variabil-
ity of those methods.145 For example, the authors turn first to Blackstone’s
approach to statutory interpretation to demonstrate that original methods “con-
formed to original public meaning originalism, original intent originalism, or
something between the two.”146 They cite Blackstone’s emphasis on “interpret-
[ing] the will of the legislator . . . by exploring his intentions at the time when
the law was made, by signs the most natural and probable.”147 As for Black-
stone’s means to discern these intentions, they explain:
Blackstone gives pride of place to text, mentioning first that interpreters
should look to the “usual and most known” meaning of the words of a statute.
While Blackstone’s intentionalism thus has a textualist component, he also
authorizes interpreters, especially when the words are “dubious,” to look to
other considerations, such as context, subject matter, and effect. Most impor-
tant, Blackstone states that judges should look to the reason and spirit of the
law—that is, “the cause which moved the legislator to enact” the law. Under
this last approach, judges can depart from the language of a statute if they
believe it is necessary to further the legislature’s intent.148
144. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 127, at 133.
145. In other words, even if McGinnis and Rappaport were correct to focus on Blackstone and their
other examples to demonstrate original methods, those very examples demonstrate the indeterminacy of
such methods. Yet the premise that original methods can decisively be traced to Blackstone or some
other interpreter or handful of interpreters itself is misguided. Kurt Lash details the historical problems
with this premise in his review of McGinnis and Rappaport’s book. See Lash, supra note 94, at 154–61.
146. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 127, at 134.
147. Id. at 135 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59).
148. Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *61).
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This very description suggests a wide zone of discretion for judges, particu-
larly in applying such concepts as the law’s “context, subject matter, and
effect,” and its “reason and spirit.”149 The Blackstone example is consistent in
this respect with other examples that McGinnis and Rappaport cite to demon-
strate that original methods embodied some form of originalism.150 The ex-
ample is also consistent with those invoked by political scientist Howard
Gillman, whose work McGinnis and Rappaport cite for support.151
It is only by defining originalism so broadly that McGinnis and Rappaport
can confidently assert that it is, in some form or another, an original method.
This is consistent with the abundant evidence that language itself, particularly
much constitutional and political language, was in a state of flux around the
time of the founding.152 Thus, McGinnis and Rappaport’s own evidence rein-
forces the core conundrum with which this section began; that is, thick and
determinative original meanings often are not epistemologically defensible.
This is not to say that modern adjudicators are helpless to resolve constitutional
questions or must look entirely beyond the Constitution and its history to do so.
It is to say, however, that the ability to answer these questions solely through the
original definitions of the Constitution’s words, rather than through broader
considerations of structure, purpose, and constitutional principles, is limited at
best. Such indeterminate—albeit not unbounded—inquiries entail far more than
merely excavating the original definitions of the text’s words. The concept of
“construction” is useful precisely to distinguish more discretionary exercises—
including the application of textual principles to modern circumstances and the
articulation and application of structural constitutional principles—from the act
of discerning original definitions. Collapsing both activities into the category of
“interpretation” obscures the degree of uncertainty and discretion that interpreta-
tion, so broadly construed, entails. It also caricatures construction. If interpreta-
tion encompasses all considerations of constitutional reason, spirit, structure,
purpose, and principle, then construction presumably must entail only “extracon-
stitutional principles.” Indeed, McGinnis and Rappaport characterize construc-
tion in precisely this way. As such, they drape a normatively attractive broad
tent around the concept of “interpretation,” while still deeming interpretation
determinate by its contrast with a caricatured version of construction.
Finally, the examples that commentators cite to demonstrate originalism’s
determinacy and normative benefits themselves reflect a broad discretion to
choose and apply originalist methods. We have seen, for example, that Justice
149. Id.
150. See id. at 135–38.
151. See id. at 138, 253 n.96 (citing Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism
and the Rise of the Notion of the “Living Constitution” in the Course of American State-Building, 11
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 191, 200, 204–06 (1997) (referencing statements on interpretation by Madison,
Hamilton, and Story, among others)).
152. It is also consistent with copious evidence to the effect that interpretive theories themselves
abounded and competed with one another during the founding era. See Lash, supra note 94, at 154–61.
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Scalia considers the Eighth Amendment’s original expected applications, where
known, to be determinative. Indeed, he deems this fact to drain any moral or
policymaking aspects from the question of the death penalty’s constitutionality
under the Eighth Amendment. Justice Scalia also uses the Eighth Amendment to
exemplify the notion that constitutional interpretations are most liberty-
protective when they yield thick original meanings. By locking in “society’s
assessment of what [was] cruel” in 1791, the Eighth Amendment protects us
against “the moral perceptions of a future, more brutal, generation.”153
Yet when it comes to the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, Justice
Scalia and other commentators claim thick, liberty-protective results with no
apparent consideration, or even acknowledgment, of original expected applica-
tions. Indeed, the “freedom of speech” is a notoriously vague term with
notoriously unhelpful history.154 To the extent that thick original meanings of
the Free Speech Clause have been offered, the meanings are typically restrictive
in nature. The most common thick original meaning proposed entails a right
only to publish without prior restraint, not to be free from punishment post-
publication.155 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia, with his coauthor Bryan Garner,
suggests that his vote to overturn an anti-flag-burning statute was originalist in
nature.156 As Judge Richard Posner observes, the example is a “curious [one]
for a textualist originalist to give . . . since the eighteenth-century concept of
freedom of speech was much narrower than the modern concept.”157 In other
words, Justice Scalia appears unconcerned, in the flag-burning context, with
discerning “society’s assessment,” in 1791, of the meaning of freedom of
speech.158
McGinnis and Rappaport more explicitly link generous free speech protec-
tions to thick original meanings, writing:
153. Scalia, supra note 110, at 145.
154. As Ashutosh Bhagwat explains: “What is clear, the only thing that is clear, is that any firm
statements about the original intent of the First Amendment should be met with extreme skepticism
given the paucity and contradictory nature of the historical evidence.” Ashutosh Bhagwat, Posner,
Blackstone, and Prior Restraints on Speech, 2015 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 24),
http://ssrn.com/abstract2560473.
155. See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker, Originalism 2.0 Meets the First Amendment: The “New
Originalism,” Interpretive Methodology, and Freedom of Expression, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 329,
334–36 (2012); Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating First
Amendment Protections for Leakers of Classified Information, 6 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 409, 421–22
(2013); Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 613 (2008). In an
important new essay, Ashutosh Bhagwat acknowledges that the “understanding of the First Amend-
ment’s history as reaching only prior restraints on speech has a long pedigree and strong support.”
Bhagwat, supra note 154, at 3. He argues, however, that “this understanding is wrong,” and that some
“aspects of it are clearly and obviously wrong.” Id. at 4.
156. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 17 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)).
157. Richard A. Posner, The Spirit Killeth, but the Letter Giveth Life, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 2012,
at 18–19 (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3.
158. Scalia, supra note 111, at 44.
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By guaranteeing the right to criticize government, the First Amendment
promotes political competition and effective democracy. But if the First
Amendment were understood in abstract terms as delegating its content to
future interpreters, its value would be greatly reduced. The First Amendment
might then permit a party in power to suppress speech on various grounds,
allowing the party to insulate itself from criticism.159
Yet for the reasons noted above, it is far from clear that “the right to criticize
government” is the original meaning of the First Amendment. Nor do McGinnis
and Rappaport offer any evidence to this effect. Rather, they appear simply to
assume, whether in light of current doctrine, their own reading of the Free
Speech Clause, or for some other reason, that this definition plainly is the
Clause’s original meaning.
C. THE TROUBLE WITH THE THINNESS BIAS
New originalism, particularly that embodied by Balkin’s framework original-
ism, substantially improves on more determinate approaches. First, the exis-
tence of constitutional provisions that are less than fully determinate—either
because they are thin or because they bear more than one plausible meaning—is
consistent with much historical evidence. Interpretative theories that reflect
indeterminacy thus are more likely epistemologically defensible than competing
approaches. Second, to the extent that any normative theories of interpretation
depend on capturing the benefits of (epistemologically defensible) original
meanings, those benefits will most likely be reaped through approaches that
embrace indeterminacy. Third, new originalists, and Professor Balkin in particu-
lar, offer far sounder definitions of interpretation and construction than those
relied on by Professors McGinnis and Rappaport. To Balkin, interpretation
involves only ascertaining the original definitions, or original meanings, of
constitutional provisions.160 Everything beyond that is construction. In particu-
lar, implementing constitutional principles embodied in the text, and ascertain-
ing and implementing constitutional principles revealed by constitutional
structure, are important aspects of construction.161 This narrow definition of
interpretation is extremely useful. It enables interpreters and audiences alike to
track when interpreters are simply ascertaining (or arguing amongst themselves)
constitutional word meanings, and when they have moved beyond this stage.
This helps to prevent the slipperiness with which interpreters might otherwise
conflate the act of defining textual provisions with that of articulating or
applying unwritten constitutional principles. Furthermore, in mushing together
159. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 128, at 767.
160. BALKIN, supra note 13, at 4–5 (distinguishing “interpretation-as-ascertainment” and “interpreta-
tion-as-construction” as two separate activities involved in “constitutional interpretation”); see also id.
at 13 (explaining that “fidelity to ‘original meaning’ in constitutional interpretation” means fidelity to
“the semantic content of the words in the clause”).
161. See id. at 14–15.
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various parts of the interpretive–constructive enterprise, interpreters also may
muddle or gloss over individual pieces of that enterprise. They may, for
example, simply assume that original expected applications are synonymous
with original semantic meanings without digging into history to determine
whether the two indeed were equated in debates over the provisions at issue. In
contrast, a narrow vision of interpretation, coupled with a distinction between
interpretation and construction, fosters relative candor and precision in interpre-
tation and construction alike.
Yet new originalists themselves display some epistemic overconfidence in
conducting the interpretation phase, and Balkin’s work is illustrative in this
respect as well. If the broad methodological tent stitched by McGinnis and
Rappaport enables interpreters to veer toward or away from expected applica-
tions with little explanation, so Balkin’s methodology imposes too rigid a bar on
equating textual principles or standards with expected applications.162 Just as
McGinnis and Rappaport justified their commitment to thick original meanings
through their views that such meanings are normatively desirable and thus
likely to have been intended by the founders, so Balkin justifies eschewing
expected applications with assumptions as to what the founders envisioned for
their constitutional plan, which in turn is buttressed by Balkin’s normative
embrace of framework originalism. Indeed, Balkin contrasts the work of “seri-
ous intellectual history,” in which “one must understand how vague and abstract
concepts were used in their own time,” with the goals of legal interpretation.163
The latter understands laws not solely as the discretion-limiting tools envisioned
by McGinnis, Rappaport, and Scalia, but as “plans for social action in the future
as well as in the present.”164
As is true of public meaning originalism more broadly, Balkin’s approach is
too dismissive of the interpretive significance of actual founding era understand-
ings and expectations. It is too quick to assume that constitutional words indeed
had “generally recognized semantic meanings” rather than meanings that were
contested or that varied contextually.165 More fundamentally, and again as with
public meaning originalism in general, an emphasis on words’ general mean-
ings, as distinct from the particular understandings surrounding their drafting
and ratification, invites interpretive mischief. Although actual framing and
ratifying understandings of word meanings are not fully dispositive for interpre-
tive purposes, they should play an important role in interpretive inquiries so as
to tether modern interpreters to historical realities. More so, although Balkin is
absolutely correct that expected applications are not necessarily synonymous
with original meanings, it goes too far to say that the latter can never equal the
162. See id. at 12 (“[O]riginal expected applications are not part of the text and they are not
themselves binding law.”).
163. Id. at 44.
164. Id. at 45.
165. Id.
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former.166
In some cases, the lines between founders’ expected applications and their
beliefs in the meanings of the words that they drafted or ratified may be blurred.
For example, let us assume that the common usage of the terms “cruel and
unusual punishment” was, at the time of the founding, as open-ended as it
appears today, amounting to a standard with applications subject to reasonable
dispute. However, let us also imagine, hypothetically, that there was robust
discussion throughout the ratification debates to the effect that cruel and unusual
was meant, in the Constitution, as a term of art. The term of art embodied a
particular set of practices that were widely rejected by the founding generation.
Suppose that this point was made repeatedly and publicly in ratification debates
to quell concerns that the phrase was so open-ended that it might preclude the
death penalty or other accepted practices, or, conversely, that the provision
might one day be deemed to permit practices that the founders deemed abhor-
rent. Finally, suppose that there was another, equally active and high-profile
strain of argument in the ratification debates to the effect that, Federalist
promises aside, the term cruel and unusual punishment was intrinsically open-
ended and subject to undesirable changes in application over the years.
This hypothetical scenario would present a genuinely tough call as to the
“best” original meaning. This is because many among the ratifying generation
likely believed, quite reasonably, that the term cruel and unusual in the Constitu-
tion was a term of art encompassing a definite set of rules. This is a very
different thing from founding expectations as to how an open-ended term would
be applied. The former is not simply a matter of expected applications, but
rather entails reasonable beliefs as to the semantic meaning of cruel and unusual
punishment as the term is used in the Constitution. On the other hand, there is
an equally reasonable case for a thin, open-ended original meaning based on the
same set of hypothetical facts.
Balkin recognizes the possibility—indeed, the historical reality—of such
scenarios. He observes that open-ended constitutional provisions are sometimes
drafted to paper over differences that would prevent supermajority coalitions
from forming had more specific terms been used.167 He illustrates this point by
reference to Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which contains the Due
Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges or Immunities Clauses:
Congress chose general phrases in section 1 because of the conflicting
interests and values of moderates and radicals within the Republican Party
and because of concerns about how more specific guarantees of rights for
blacks would play in the 1866 elections and the ratification campaign. The
166. Cf. Colby, supra note 6, at 582 (“[I]f there was public disagreement on expected application,
then it is quite likely that there was no public agreement on original meaning either.”); Griffin, supra
note 90, at 1204 (“The meaning of a constitutional provision in the abstract is rarely at issue.”).
167. Tom Colby writes at length about this aspect of constitutional drafting and ratification. See
generally Colby, supra note 106.
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Fourteenth Amendment served as the Republicans’ platform for the elections
of 1866, and “[l]ike all American party platforms, the Republican Platform for
1866 had to be sufficiently ambiguous and broad to attract quite divergent
segments of the nation’s electorate.” Moderates and radicals chose open-
ended “language capable of growth” that papered over their differences and
allowed them to present a unified front that would appeal to a wide range of
constituencies. Moderates could report to their constituents that phrases like
“privileges or immunities” and “equal protection” did not require integrated
facilities and did not threaten laws against interracial marriage; radicals could
point to the broad guarantees of equal citizenship to push for future reforms.
By deliberately using language containing broad principles, specific applica-
tions would be left to future generations to work out.168
Although Balkin views these events as culminating in plainly thin
textual principles, there is a more complex possibility from an
actual-understandings-based perspective. From that perspective, the words ad-
opted, in context, had different meanings to different constituencies. Some
might have understood themselves to be supporting the ratification of terms of
art that, informed by future interpreters’ historical inquiries, would lock in thick
meanings. Others might have understood themselves to be doing exactly what
Balkin suggests—embracing broad principles with applications that would be
filled out by future generations. Apart from these understandings, any credible
public meaning evidence—for example, evidence of words’ general usages at
the time—might suggest still other plausible meanings or bolster the plausibility
of one or more actual understandings. The breadth and malleability of the
original methods cited by McGinnis and Rappaport also support the possibility
of multiple, contested meanings.169
168. BALKIN, supra note 13, at 26 (first quoting WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 143 (1988); and then quoting Alexander M. Bickel, The
Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59–63 (1955)); see also
Colby, supra note 6, at 596 (“Issues of racial equality and of federal constraints on the states’ ability to
interfere with personal liberty were so touchy and divisive in the aftermath of the Civil War that an
amendment written in concrete terms, rather than soaring and ambiguous platitudes, would never have
stood a chance.”).
169. The 2015 Cato brief on same-sex marriage, cited in this Article’s introduction, is open to
similar critique. Looking solely at the evidence and argument presented in the brief, one sees a
convincing case to the effect that “equal protection” embodies an anticaste principle. See Brief for Cato
Institute et al., supra note 18, at 12–15. Yet the brief also acknowledges that the original meaning
leaves room for legislatures to draw relevant, nonarbitrary distinctions between groups. See id. at
16–17. The sum of these two definitional pieces plausibly could be an anticaste principle thicker than
that articulated in the brief. It could amount, for example, to a bar only on subordinating distinctions
based on characteristics closely analogous to, or even proxies for race or a previous condition of
servitude. To be clear, I find much of the Cato argument convincing. Yet it is most convincing if framed
as a two-step argument to the effect that: (a) an abstract anticaste principle is one plausible interpreta-
tion of the evidence (more so, it is the thinnest common denominator meaning to the extent that the
other plausible meanings are thicker versions of the same principle), and (b) in the construction zone,
that principle, as applied to modern evidence and understandings, is consistent with striking down
same-sex marriage bans.
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None of this necessarily obviates the conclusion that textual provisions that
appear to reflect open-ended standards or principles should be deemed to
encompass such standards or principles as opposed to thicker standards and
principles or their expected applications. Yet this conclusion cannot rely on the
assumption that such interpretations are always the most historically plausible
ones. As such, it also cannot be justified by the normative benefits said to flow
from following historically accurate interpretations. The conclusion can, how-
ever, be justified partly through the normative benefits that Balkin identifies
with thin constitutional provisions. Furthermore, and at the heart of this Arti-
cle’s analysis, the embrace of the thinnest common denominator meaning, or of
all plausible meanings at the interpretation phase where there is no common
core meaning, is the best way—or more candidly, the least bad way—to
approach accuracy when it is combined with a construction phase that focuses
first and foremost on applying underlying constitutional principles to the facts at
hand. Additionally, this approach is a more democratically legitimate one in
light of its candor relative to other, less epistemologically modest methods.
Finally, interpretive modesty—specifically, the directive that one should choose
the thinnest of plausible contested meanings at the interpretation phase (or
identify all plausible meanings where there is no shared, common core mean-
ing) and then apply underlying principles at the construction phase—is appli-
cable to all constitutional provisions, not only those that textually consist of
principles and standards. Interpretive modesty thus offers needed guidance in
realms beyond those of textual principles and standards.
III. INTERPRETIVE MODESTY
This Part elaborates on interpretive modesty and its epistemic and normative
justifications. The discussion is broken into four parts. Section A defines
original meaning and interpretation. Section B explains interpretive modesty’s
approach to discerning provisions’ plausible original meanings and to choosing
among those meanings. Section C explores the role and content of the construc-
tion zone. Section D explains why construction is a better means to supplement
textual thinness than the default interpretive rules suggested by some public
meaning originalists.
A. THE MEANING OF ORIGINAL MEANING AND INTERPRETATION
This Article agrees with new originalists that original meaning encompasses
nothing more than the original definitions of textual provisions. For example,
suppose that we are evaluating the constitutionality of a statute imposing
criminal penalties on anyone who “makes an untruthful statement about a
candidate for political office within ten days of the election in which that
candidate is running.” The First Amendment bars any law “abridging the
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freedom of speech.”170 Were it clear that the term “abridging,” as used in the
first amendment, were a term of art meaning only to impose a prior restraint, it
would be equally clear, as a matter of original meaning alone, that the First
Amendment does not invalidate the provision in question. Yet because it is at
least plausibly disputable that the term “abridging” is not so limited, and
because the light shed by history on the definitional parameters of the Clause is
fairly dim, we cannot answer the question solely by discerning the text’s
original meaning.171
This is not to say that history and text cannot help us to evaluate the
constitutionality of our hypothetical statute. Indeed, because the meanings of
“abridging,” “the freedom of speech” and “abridging the freedom of speech”
are not self-evident, we must look—as theorists and judges have done for
decades—to the values and goals underlying the Clause.172 Among other things,
it surely is relevant that a core concern of both Federalist and Anti-Federalist
founders was ensuring that the deeds and misdeeds of governors would be
detectable.173 Of course, this does not resolve the law’s constitutionality. We
ought still to consider how these concerns apply to untruthful speech and what
light if any founding views on untruthful speech and its value may shed on our
inquiry. More so, we must consider how these various concerns apply logically
to the facts. For instance, even if we were convinced that untruthful speech adds
no value to the political marketplace of ideas and in fact taints it, we ought to
weigh this conclusion against the difficulties of separating truth from falsehood
in many instances and the risk of chilling the truthful speech of speakers fearful
that they may be mistaken.
To resolve the statute’s constitutionality, then, one must discern the original
semantic meaning of “abridging the freedom of speech,” assess the values
underlying the Free Speech Clause, weigh any conflicting values, and consider
how they should apply to the provision at issue. To place all of these steps under
the umbrella of “discovering and applying original meaning” obscures more
than it clarifies. As we have seen, there are political advantages to defining
original meaning and its application so broadly. It enables one to deem original-
ism determinate by using it to embrace thick meanings in some cases (for
170. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
171. See supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text.
172. The literature exploring free speech values is vast. A small but eclectic sampling includes, for
example, ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); FREDER-
ICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990); Vincent Blasi, Samuel Pool Weaver Constitutional Law Essay, The
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521; Bork, supra note 29;
Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963);
Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A
Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 283 (2011); Susan H. Williams,
Essay Feminist Jurisprudence and Free Speech Theory, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1563 (1994).
173. For discussion and citations to this effect, see, for example, Kitrosser, supra note 155, at
422–26.
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example, by defining the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to permit
punishments that were permitted at the founding) while applying underlying
constitutional values in other cases, and deeming the exercise and its results
(such as broad protections for free speech) originalist in nature.174
Yet by deeming original meaning no more and no less than the original
definition of a provision’s words, one lays the groundwork for relative candor
and precision in constitutional decision making. This nomenclature does not
prevent disputes over original definitions from arising. But it does clarify what
is within—and what is outside—the parameters of such disputes. If one is truly
arguing over the semantic definition of “abridging the freedom of speech,” one
can make their case as to why their definition is plausible and why other
definitions are implausible. By the same token, one can point out when disagree-
ments extend beyond questions of original meaning. For example, decision
makers might agree that “abridging the freedom of speech” refers to more than
imposing a prior restraint but does not include all acts that burden speech in any
way. In looking for guidance from underlying principles, however, the decision
makers might find that they disagree over the content of those principles or their
application. For example, they might agree that false speech has no constitu-
tional value but disagree over whether our hypothetical statute so threatens to
chill truthful speech as to justify its invalidation.
Such candor and precision can make it more difficult for decision makers,
whether consciously or unconsciously, to conflate those aspects of their deci-
sions that are compelled by textual directives with those that are grounded in
more discretionary judgments about the content and application of relevant
constitutional principles. This can make for better judicial decision making by
illuminating what is logically at issue at different stages of analysis. Such
relative judicial candor also has democratic legitimacy benefits. Members of the
public might perceive that judges are grappling with questions of original
meaning while acknowledging and addressing those matters that cannot be
resolved solely through definitional excavation. Indeed, Dan Kahan draws on
social psychology research to posit that norms that “promote exaggerated
certitude in judicial opinion writing”175—a feature that he points out is manifest
in much originalist reasoning—amplify popular “suspicion and resentment.”176
They do so “because they evince a form of rectitude that implies bias or
174. Tom Colby and Peter Smith make a similar point. Citing Justice Thomas in particular, the
authors charge that he “shift[s] back and forth” between different types of originalism to reach desired
results, “all the while insisting that ‘[s]trict adherence to [the originalist] approach is essential if we are
to fulfill our constitutionally assigned role of giving full effect to the mandate of the Framers without
infusing the constitutional fabric with our own political views.’” Colby & Smith, supra note 4, at 304
(alteration in original) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 367 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
175. Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court Term 2010—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated
Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 61 (2011).
176. Id. at 8.
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self-delusion on the part of those who see things otherwise.”177 The benefits of
candor and clarity may extend beyond judicial writings as well, to public and
political debates over the constitutionality of proposed legislative or executive
branch actions.178
Finally, insofar as it enhances decision-making candor and clarity to define
original meaning narrowly, so it is all the better to distinguish the act of
discerning original meaning from the act of fleshing out thin original meanings
to resolve constitutional questions. It is thus useful to adopt the new originalist
nomenclature signaling this distinction. It is useful, in other words, to distin-
guish between discerning original meaning, which new originalists label “inter-
pretation,” and supplementing thin original meanings where necessary to resolve
constitutional questions, which new originalists label “construction.”
B. DISCERNING AND CHOOSING BETWEEN PLAUSIBLE ORIGINAL MEANINGS IN THE
INTERPRETATION ZONE
Having defined original meaning, one still must determine how to seek it out.
Our lodestar in this venture is epistemic humility. Humility is called for in light
of the originally fluctuating and contested meanings of many constitutional
provisions. It is also called for in light of modern originalist analyses that reveal
ongoing, apparently intractable disagreements and uncertainties as to both
original meanings and original interpretive methods. Epistemic humility has
two implications for the practice of seeking out original meanings. First, it
demands attention both to evidence of actual understandings and to the type of
evidence considered by adherents of original public meaning. Given the imper-
fections of both the actual understanding and public meaning approaches, each
should be employed as a check on the other. Second, it counsels embracing, and
177. Id. Tim O’Neill suggests that a similar phenomenon might lead the Supreme Court’s
“hedgehogs”—like Scalia, who view constitutional questions as puzzles with indisputably correct
answers—to alienate their colleagues more readily than its “foxes,” such as Breyer, who view
constitutional questions as mysteries without definitive conclusions. Timothy P. O’Neill, Scalia’s Poker:
Puzzles and Mysteries in Constitutional Interpretation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 663, 676, 679–83 (2007).
178. An editor of this Article astutely asked how one might reconcile this democratic legitimacy
argument with the survey findings, cited earlier, to the effect that four out of ten respondents believe
that “[i]n making decisions, the Supreme Court should only consider the original intentions of the
authors of the Constitution” as opposed to “consider[ing] changing times and current realities in
applying the principles of the Constitution.” See Greene et al., supra note 45, at 362 (emphasis added).
This is an excellent question and I offer two responses. First, to the extent that a sizeable chunk of the
public believes that original meanings are fully determinate, interpretively modest opinions would be
directed in part toward attempting to persuade such persons otherwise. Second, I suspect—and the
survey results themselves suggest—that a generally stated preference for determinate originalism is not
purely abstract, but may be tied to particular outcome preferences. For persons with such preferences,
the rationales in particular cases may matter much less than the outcomes. To the extent that the
rationales do matter, those persons may be somewhat less resistant to opinions bearing unwelcome
outcomes where the opinions are couched in interpretively modest terms, versus terms deeming the
outcomes inescapably dictated by history and the opinions’ authors disinterested servants of that
history.
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offering an interpretively modest means to address, the possibility that a provi-
sion will have more than one plausible original meaning.
In seeking out original meanings, then, interpretive modesty’s first step is to
look to evidence both of original public meanings and of actual understandings.
With respect to original public meaning evidence, interpreters should look to
evidence of the meaning of particular words and phrases not solely in the
framing and ratification contexts, but “within the political and linguistic commu-
nity that adopted the text as law” more generally.179 By looking to this broader
context, interpreters can guard against the risks of cherry-picking unrepresenta-
tive quotations from framing or ratification debates, of relying on private
thoughts or intentions of founders that did not factor into the public framing or
ratification dialogues, or of elevating subjective intentions over the text that was
ratified as law. Yet public meaning evidence itself poses risks of manipulation or
misunderstanding as great as, if not greater than, those posed by actual under-
standings evidence. Perhaps the most straightforward risk of public meaning
analysis is that it will bear little if any relationship to actual understandings of
the time. Recall Saul Cornell’s warning, echoed by other critics, that “[i]gnoring
the real voices of eighteenth century Americans . . . enables some [public mean-
ing originalists] to side step dealing with the actual beliefs of Americans and
substitute the beliefs of a fictive reader, effectively turning constitutional interpre-
tation into an act of historical ventriloquism.”180 This admonition is well in
keeping with historians’ broader observations that much founding-era political
and legal discourse was contested and in flux, and that it is thus vain to seek out
single, objectively correct meanings for all constitutional provisions.181 Attentive-
ness to actual understandings also helps to mitigate the risk of anachronistic
uses of public meaning evidence. Cornell criticizes modern uses of founding-era
dictionaries, for example, explaining that “[e]arly dictionaries, including the
first American dictionaries, were not compiled according to the rules of modern
lexicography. These texts were idiosyncratic products of their authors, who
often had ideological and political agendas. As a general rule, such dictionaries
were more prescriptive than descriptive.”182 Actual understandings evidence
can provide a literal reality check against such pitfalls of public meaning
originalism.
Of course, there is no magic formula for determining when actual understand-
ings and public meaning evidence suffice to make an original meaning histori-
cally plausible. As a rule of thumb, however, a plausible original meaning is one
that would have been unsurprising to someone involved in the ratification
179. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 37, at 1131.
180. Cornell, supra note 99, at 299, 301.
181. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 631 (2008); Cornell, supra note 99, at 296, 301; Rakove,
supra note 96, at 588–93; Gordon S. Wood, The Fundamentalists and the Constitution, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Feb. 18, 1988, at 33, pt.4.
182. Cornell, supra note 99, at 298 (footnote omitted).
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debates, as evidenced by actual framing and ratification discussions, by broader
word usage, and by broader historical context. Because the threshold of “unsur-
prising” is not terribly demanding, more than one contestable meaning surely
will exist for some provisions. This is, of course, entirely consistent with the
views of historians. At the same time, that a meaning should have been
unsurprising to actual, not just hypothetical, founders will eliminate some more
anachronistic meanings from the interpretation zone.183
Interpretive modesty’s second step entails acknowledging and addressing the
reality that more than one plausible original meaning will be discernible in
some cases. In such cases, interpretive modesty counsels against deeming one
meaning best and, thus, the interpretive “winner.” As explained earlier, there is
simply no basis in past, or present, original meaning inquiries or originalist
methodological insights to believe that the relative correctness of historically
plausible original meanings can be quantified and ranked in a principled way.
Where more than one plausible original meaning exists, interpreters should
candidly acknowledge that fact.
After acknowledging that more than one plausible meaning exists, interpret-
ers should take one of two approaches. Where there is a common core of
meaning as between plausible definitions, only that common core should be
deemed locked into the text as a matter of original meaning. This leaves room
for partisans of thicker meanings—those meanings that go beyond the relatively
thin common core—to argue that their meanings should be adopted at the
construction phase. For example, as the next section elaborates, there is a
common core among plausible original meanings of “the executive power.”
That is, that the executive power means at least the power to oversee execution
of the laws passed by the legislature. Whether the original meaning is thicker
than that—specifically, whether it entails the power to personally execute all
laws passed by the legislature and to fire executive subordinates at will—is
highly contestable. Yet by locking in only the thin common core—that the
executive power entails at least the power to oversee execution of the legisla-
ture’s laws—we leave room for partisans of broader powers to argue at the
construction phase that the principles underlying the Executive Power Clause
demand greater powers.
This leaves us with the question of what to do in cases in which there are
more than one plausible original meanings but no common core of meaning
among those options. This scenario seems unlikely to arise often, given the
requirement of historical plausibility. In other words, it seems unlikely that two
meanings, so different from one another as to share no common core, will both
183. It bears reminding at this juncture that original meanings are not necessarily synonymous with
expected applications. Hence, that a given provision stood for a broad principle might have been
unsurprising to ratification debate participants, even if a proposed modern application of that same
principle would have been surprising. At the same time, the notion that a broad textual principle was
actually a term of art, or a synecdoche for the modern application, would be implausible if that
application would have been surprising to ratification debate participants.
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be historically plausible in the sense of consistency with broader word usage of
the time and in terms of actual understandings. Logically, however, the scenario
is certainly possible. For instance, the record might show that a particular
open-ended provision could plausibly embody either one of two incompatible
principles. Should such a case indeed arise, then interpreters should borrow a
concept from Professor Meyler and deem the interpretation zone a “domain of
contested meanings.”184 In other words, interpreters should identify the plau-
sible definitions and leave the work of choosing between them to the construc-
tion zone.
C. THE ROLE AND CONTENT OF THE CONSTRUCTION ZONE
Our work now brings us to the construction zone, and to the question of what
ought to happen there. As we have seen, some commentators paint a caricatured
picture of construction, suggesting that it has virtually no relationship to textual
or historical inquiries. This caricature is the flip side of such theorists’ expansive
definitions of original meaning. If original meaning encompasses everything
from text to the law’s “reason and spirit,” then there is little left to do in the
construction zone that does not yank one away from the Constitution entirely.185
To be fair, new originalists take differing approaches to the content of the
construction zone, leaving critics without one clear meaning of construction to
which to respond. Nonetheless, most new originalists do focus on identifying
and applying constitutional principles in the construction zone, an enterprise
entirely consistent with seeking out the law’s “reason and spirit.” For example,
recall Jack Balkin’s emphasis on the construction zone as a forum for applying
the original principles embodied in textual provisions such as the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.186 It is true that Balkin emphasizes the role of social movements in
guiding courts and other interpreters in the construction zone. But his point is
that these movements do and should play important roles in influencing the
application of original principles, not that they should have a free hand in
dictating new principles. Furthermore, some new originalists use construction to
identify and apply constitutional principles inferable from the Constitution’s
text and structure more broadly, beyond the provision directly at issue. As
Randy Barnett writes: “Most who engage in constitutional construction strive to
take into account constitutional principles that underlie the text. The most
important of these are the structural principles of separation of powers and
federalism.”187
This Article takes the view that the construction zone’s first and most
important role is as a forum for arguing which, among a provision’s plausible
184. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
185. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 127, at 135 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*61).
186. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
187. BARNETT, supra note 38, at 125.
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meanings, best vindicates the principles and purposes underlying that provision.
For example, because original meaning alone cannot resolve the free speech
hypothetical posed in Part III.A, one must choose between those answers
plausibly consistent with original meaning by considering the principles underly-
ing the Free Speech Clause and how best to apply those principles to the facts.
Such an exercise of construction is hardly alien to the interpretive search for
original meaning. To the contrary, it is the logical next step in an effort to
answer a single question: how to faithfully effectuate the constitutional text.
Construction simply reflects the realization that original meaning alone cannot
reliably resolve all constitutional questions, and that shielding one’s eyes from
this fact stymies, rather than advances, constitutional fidelity. Certainly, commen-
tators may reasonably disagree over the relevant constitutional principles or
their applications in the construction zone. But that is different from treating the
construction zone as a realm in which constitutional text, structure, and prin-
ciples do not matter. Furthermore, explicitly hashing out such questions in the
construction zone, and distinguishing them from original meaning questions,
bears the benefits of clarity and candor.
Apart from yielding first-order answers to constitutional questions—such as
whether our hypothetical restriction on political lies passes constitutional
muster—the judiciary can use construction to address second-order questions
regarding who, as between it and the political branches, should resolve the
first-order questions. Courts may, for instance, defer heavily or completely to
legislative judgments on some first-order questions. Such deference might itself
follow from constitutional principles. A court might, for example, decide that
principles of federalism counsel deference to state legislatures on matters not
fully resolved by original meaning. The court thus might decline to invalidate
our hypothetical state statute restricting political lies. Conversely, a court may
decide that free speech principles demand presumptive suspicion toward any
restrictions on political speech, and thus deference is not warranted with respect
to a state law restricting political lies.
Extraconstitutional factors, as well as factors partly constitutional and partly
extraconstitutional, may be considered in the construction zone as well. For
instance, among the factors that the Supreme Court says it considers in deciding
whether to treat a first-order question as a “political question” that it will decline
to resolve are the presence or absence of “an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made[,] or the potentiality of embarrass-
ment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one ques-
tion.”188 Judicial precedent also provides central guidance to courts. Judicial
precedent itself typically comprises some mixture of interpretation and construc-
tion. Respect for judicial precedent is partly a product of stare decisis, itself a
tool of construction.
188. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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Although the construction zone may include extraconstitutional or partly
extraconstitutional factors, all such factors must be subordinate to constitutional
ones. Indeed, interpretive modesty shares with new originalism the premise that
original meaning constrains the construction zone. Above all else, any construc-
tions must be consistent with original meaning. And in the construction zone
itself, constitutional principles and their application have pride of place. Again,
it is the candid attention to constitutional principles where original meaning
runs out that makes interpretive modesty more constitutionally faithful than
approaches that ignore competing original meanings or purport to resolve them
through interpretation alone.
D. CONSTRUCTION VS. DEFAULT INTERPRETIVE RULES
Some public meaning originalists agree that new originalism does not always
yield thick, determinate meanings. They argue, however, that determinate an-
swers always can and should be found through default rules of adjudication,
obviating the need for construction. For example, Gary Lawson argues that
judges should reject the claims of parties who have the burden of proof and are
unable to meet it through original meaning. Lawson would place the burden of
proof with whichever party asserts a constitutional claim. In practice, because
the Constitution is a “grant of certain powers to the federal government and a
denial of certain powers to state governments,”189 “advocates of federal power
will almost always bear the burden of proof while opponents of state power
will . . . always bear the burden of proof.”190 Additionally, a party asserting that
the Constitution affirmatively prohibits particular government action would bear
the burden of proof on that claim.191 Michael Paulsen finds a different default
rule supplied by “original-meaning textualism [itself].” That is, “where the
Constitution fails to resolve a particular issue, or leaves open a range of
meaning or choice, it is open for popular, representative self-government to act”
without judicial intervention.192
As Larry Solum notes, these default rules themselves are “paradigm cases of
rules of construction,”193 despite their framing as alternatives to construction’s
indeterminacy. They are rules of construction because they are not dictated by
the original meaning of the text. Rather, they are means to “determine legal
effect when the meaning of the text runs out.”194 That these default rules are
tools of construction is significant not because the construction label matters in
its own right. It is significant because it means that the rules stem from
something outside of the constitutional text, such as normative preferences or
views of constitutional structure, history, or principles. Yet because they are
189. Lawson, supra note 85, at 1565.
190. Id. at 1564; see also Lawson, supra note 87, at 425–28.
191. Lawson, supra note 87, at 426.
192. Paulsen, supra note 89, at 915.
193. Solum, supra note 10, at 516.
194. Id.; see also Rosenthal, supra note 27, at 1230–31, 1231 n.261.
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presented as rules that transcend construction, they would obviate inquiry into
countervailing considerations. The messy but important work of case-by-case
construction grounded in underlying constitutional principles or candidly norma-
tive arguments would be replaced by sweeping default rules.
To consider default rules’ potential impact in displacing construction, let us
return to our hypothetical state law against political lies. As we saw in the
previous section, construction enables us to supplement the Free Speech Clause’s
inconclusive original meaning, predominantly by looking to the purposes and
principles underlying the Clause. Indeed, the Supreme Court, doing just that
over the years, has deemed content-based laws, such as our hypothetical law,
presumptively unconstitutional. The Court also deems laws restricting political
speech particularly suspicious. And although it deems false speech largely
worthless to the marketplace of ideas, it carefully assesses government restric-
tions on the same, lest such regulations chill truthful speech or nonfalsifiable
ideas. These multiple points of construction weigh heavily against our hypotheti-
cal law.
This is not to say that there are no countervailing arguments from constitu-
tional principle, such as the notion that state laws should be deemed presump-
tively constitutional because of federalist or popular sovereignty concerns like
those raised by Lawson and Paulsen. But such competing points of construction
are just that, competing points, grounded in constitutional principle, to be
grappled with directly by weighing them against countervailing arguments.
There is no principled basis on which to elevate one point of constitutional
principle—such as that raised by Lawson or by Paulsen—into a default rule that
trumps all other considerations whenever original meaning is inconclusive.
The core trouble with the proposed default rules, then, is quite similar to that
which plagues the thickness bias. The rules create a sense of neutral precision
and determinacy only by papering over genuine constitutional conflicts and
bases for reasonable disagreement. More concretely, they sweep aside important
first- and second-order questions, mostly questions of constitutional principle,
arising case-by-case. In leaving these questions unacknowledged and unad-
dressed, the proposed default rules, like the thickness bias, would undermine
constitutional values in service of the specter of certainty and neutrality.
IV. THE EXECUTIVE POWER EXAMPLE
This Part applies interpretive modesty to the meaning of the executive power
vested in the President by Article II of the Constitution. Earlier, this Article
looked at individual rights provisions in part because they have been central to
the handful of debates that explicitly acknowledge and address originalist
determinacy. In contrast, there has been relatively little attention paid to determi-
nacy as it relates to executive power.195 More so, the term “executive power”
195. See supra note 27 (discussing a handful of references to this issue in the literature).
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appears on its face to encompass a tangible role, or roles, rather than an abstract
principle or standard. We thus can broaden our understandings of determinacy
and interpretive modesty by examining their respective relationships to execu-
tive power.
The first sentence of Article II of the Constitution reads: “The executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”196 Over
the years, interpreters have derived remarkably thick original meanings from
this Vesting Clause, meanings that would preclude Congress or the courts from
curtailing presidential power in a number of respects.197 This Part focuses on
one theory of thick original meaning, known as “unitary executive theory,” that
some scholars, jurists, and executive branch lawyers derive from the Vesting
Clause. To a unity proponent, the Constitution requires full presidential control
over all discretionary executive branch decisions and actors.198 From this
perspective, a statute that limits the President to “good cause” dismissals of
certain executive branch actors is unconstitutional, as is a statute that directs a
specific administrator to make particular decisions and forbids the President
from overriding the same.199 Unity-based objections also have been made to
statutes that require executive personnel to testify before Congress without first
clearing their testimony with the White House.200
Section A provides a brief summary of major original meaning arguments for
unitary executive theory. Sections B and C critique these arguments and explain
that their failings reflect the flaws of determinacy and the relative merits of
interpretive modesty. Section B responds to unity supporters’ straightforward
original meaning arguments—that is, their arguments as to the semantic mean-
ing of the words in the Vesting Clause. Section C examines unity supporters’
invocation of constitutional principles—particularly the principle of
accountability—as a means to bolster their original meaning arguments. This
examination demonstrates how thick original meanings, even where plausible as
a semantic matter, can positively undermine constitutional principles.
A. SUMMARY OF MAJOR ORIGINAL MEANING ARGUMENTS FOR UNITY
Unity proponents begin with the “Vesting Clause thesis,” through which they
maintain that the executive power vested in the President by Article II has
196. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
197. For the book-length treatment I devote to explaining and criticizing these presidentialist
arguments and their practical manifestations as they relate to government secrecy, see KITROSSER, supra
note 10.
198. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 595 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1158, 1166 (1992).
199. See supra note 197. But see Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential
Control, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1205, 1225 (2014) (differing from “other unitary theorists” in concluding that
a presidential ability to remove all discretionary executive actors at will “provides the necessary and
sufficient constitutional mechanism for ensuring [presidential] control”).
200. See KITROSSER, supra note 10, 262 nn.29–33 and accompanying text.
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substantive content. Although they make much of this thesis, they claim only
that the power that it vests in the President is the power to carry out the laws of
the legislature.201 Their next analytical step bears the bulk of their position’s
weight. Specifically, they reason that “[i]f the [Vesting Clause] grants the power
to execute the laws, absent some powerful textual reason or historical understand-
ing to the contrary, it must enable the president to execute the laws himself.”202
They treat this point as intuitive. They also deem it bolstered by the fact that
“[e]very other constitutional provision that grants a power to an entity permits
the recipient to exercise the power personally. For instance, no one doubts that
federal judges may exercise their federal judicial power over cases and controver-
sies by rendering judgments regarding such cases.”203 To unity’s proponents,
then, the Vesting Clause plainly bequeaths full control of every executive
decision and decision maker to the President. From this starting point, they find
that other constitutional provisions—including the Take Care and Opinions
Clauses—do not contradict this bequeathal, and in fact assume it.204
Unity proponents deem their textual understanding to be deeply supported by
history. They draw first from evidence of original meaning to deem the execu-
tive power the power to execute the law. From there, they move to the bolder
point that executive power belongs exclusively and indefeasibly to the Presi-
dent. The latter, they say, is overwhelmingly evidenced by the founding deci-
sion to create a single-headed presidency rather than a plural executive or one
with an annexed advisory council. Unity proponents also rely on founding
assurances of a singular presidency’s accountability and energy, equating them
with promises that a fully unitary executive would bear those traits.205 They
also cite the Decision of 1789 as further confirmation of their position.206 In the
201. See Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701,
704; cf. KITROSSER, supra note 10, ch. 1, 4, 5 (describing the further reaching claims of “presidential
supremacists”).
202. Prakash, supra note 1, at 716; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 198, at 579–82, 594–95.
203. Prakash, supra note 1, at 716; see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 709–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 198, at 1175–81.
204. See Prakash, supra note 1, at 721, 731; see also Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 198, at
1167–68, 1184–85, 1206–08; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 198, at 582–85.
205. In one representative discussion, for example, a pro-unity commentator writes:
The Philadelphia Convention chose a unitary executive to secure vigorous, uniform, and
responsible administration of the laws. Delegates understood that a plural executive might
result in “uncontrolled, continued and violent animosities” in the executive branch. During the
ratification struggles, many participants likewise understood the salutary consequences of a
unitary executive. There would be no councils to hide behind; there would be no plural,
divided executive that might lead to chaos. Instead, one responsible person would superintend
the administration of federal law.
Prakash, supra note 201, at 783 (internal citations omitted) (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 96 (1937) (comments of James Wilson)); see, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some
Normative Arguments for The Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 42–45 (1995).
206. See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021,
1026 (2006).
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latter case, the First Congress engaged in an epic debate over the removal
power, culminating in legislation that assumed a presidential power to remove
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.207
B. CRITIQUE OF UNITY ARGUMENTS FROM ORIGINAL MEANING; IMPLICATIONS FOR
INTERPRETIVE MODESTY
Assume for the moment that the case against a categorical unity directive is at
least as plausible, as a matter of original semantic meaning, as is the case for it.
Interpretive modesty would counsel, then, against locking in the unity directive
as a matter of original meaning. It would instead leave room for argument as to
whether, and under what circumstances, a unity directive is warranted as a
matter of construction. In the construction zone, decision makers could evaluate
the constitutional values at stake and how best to serve those values in varying,
often highly dynamic factual settings.
As it turns out, the original meaning case against a categorical unity directive
is, at minimum, every bit as plausible as the case for a unitary executive. Even
when the Vesting Clause is viewed in isolation, unity is but one reasonable
reading of it. At least equally plausible is that the phrase, “[t]he executive power
is vested in a President of the United States,” demands that the President
maintain the power to oversee or to supervise law execution—for example, that
he retain the power to dismiss executive personnel “for good cause,” if not to
substitute his own decisions for theirs or to dismiss them for any reason. This is
the view taken by Professor Peter Strauss, who argues that the President is the
“overseer and not [the] decider” of the executive branch.208
The Vesting Clause was written, read, and debated in full awareness that the
President would not and could not personally execute every aspect of every law.
For one who read the Clause knowing of this common-sense inevitability, the
Clause might still have implied that the President would personally control all
law execution in that he could substitute his judgment for that of his subordi-
nates or dismiss them for any reason at any time. But it would have been
equally plausible for the Clause to mean that the President would have supervi-
sory powers, enabling his substantial if not unfettered control over the executive
branch.
When one widens one’s view of constitutional text beyond the Vesting
Clause, the case for the President as Straussian overseer becomes stronger still.
Indeed, Strauss and other anti-unity scholars have looked predominantly beyond
the Vesting Clause to make their respective textual cases.209 For one thing, the
207. See generally id. at 1029–34, 1067–68 (describing the timeline, debate, and resulting vote).
208. Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 696, 705 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, Overseer or Decider]; see also Peter L. Strauss,
The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 573, 648–50 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, Place of Agencies].
209. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 71, 83–94 (2009); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1800–01
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text refers to other officers and departments apart from the President himself.
The text thus makes explicit the otherwise inferable point that the President will
not personally execute the laws. Indeed, the text permits the President to
“require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Of-
fices.”210 Although the Opinions Clause is not flatly inconsistent with unity, it
fits much more logically into a system whereby officers are not mere alter egos
to the President but are subject to presidential oversight. The latter vision is also
reflected in the Take Care Clause. The Take Care Clause does not order the
President to execute all laws himself. Nor does it demand that he “assure”
faithful execution of the laws, a command that would assume his full control
over the same.211 Instead, it admonishes him only to “take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.”212 Furthermore, the textually dictated system for
appointments—whereby all officers are nominated by the President but must
be approved by the Senate, and whereby Congress can vest inferior officers’
appointments in persons other than the President—also reflects a scheme consis-
tent with limits on presidential control over particular executive branch deci-
sions and actors. Article II’s anti-unity aspects are complemented by Article I’s
“sweeping,” or Necessary and Proper Clause. The latter explicitly grants Con-
gress the power to pass legislation “necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution” both Congress’ own enumerated powers and “all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.”213
Moving beyond text alone, history makes clear that unity at best was a
thoroughly contested concept. For one thing, there was no founding consensus
that the definition of executive power itself encompassed the power to remove
subordinates. And even if the power were so encompassed, there was no
consensus that the Constitution granted every aspect of it, undivided and
indefeasibly, to the President. To the contrary, two prominent Federalists as-
sured Americans during the ratification period that the President would not
possess an unfettered removal power. Writing as “An American Citizen” in “the
first substantive essay published anywhere in favor of the Constitution,”214
Tench Coxe explained that the President could not “take away offices during
good behaviour [sic].”215 Alexander Hamilton expressed a similar view in The
(1996); Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis,
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 611 (1989); Strauss, Overseer or Decider, supra note 208, at 702–05;
Strauss, Place of Agencies, supra note 208, at 597–99.
210. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
211. Professor David Driesen makes this point about the passive nature of the Take Care Clause. See
Driesen, supra note 9, at 83–84.
212. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
213. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
214. RAKOVE, supra note 108, at 275.
215. AN AMERICAN CITIZEN, AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
8 (Philadelphia, Zachariah Poulson, Junr. 1787).
508 [Vol. 104:459THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
Federalist, suggesting that senatorial consent would be needed to “displace as
well as to appoint” officers.216
The lack of a founding consensus on removal was also reflected in the First
Congress’s 1789 debate over presidential removal power. Elsewhere, I discuss
that debate and its implications in some detail.217 For our purposes, it suffices to
note that a number of participants expressed a belief similar to that expressed by
Hamilton in The Federalist—the Senate had to consent to removals of executive
officers. Still, some evinced the view that the President alone had constitutional
discretion to effectuate such removals, and others expressed confusion and
uncertainty on the matter. It is also important to remember that even those on
the removal power side argued not for a categorically unfettered removal power,
but for such a power over the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Additionally, their
position was framed in response not to a moderate restriction on the removal
power, such as a good cause requirement, but to the relatively extreme propos-
als that removal could be effectuated only with Senate consent or through
impeachment.218 The Debate of 1789 thus corroborates the lack of founding
consensus on the scope of the President’s removal power, even with respect to
the particular proposals at issue in that debate. And it certainly suggests no
broader consensus on the topic of removal writ large.
History also cuts against the notion that the original meaning of the Vesting
Clause vests an unfettered power in the President to control all discretionary
executive activity beyond the power to remove. For example, in the period
between the Revolution and the Founding, state constitutions regularly mixed
formalistic references to separated powers with breaches of executive unity and
independence.219 “[S]tate constitutions not only permitted, but actually man-
216. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). A recent
article challenges the longstanding view that Hamilton’s statement referred to the removal power. The
article suggests that by “displace,” Hamilton might have meant “replace,” and thus might have been
referring only to the Senate’s role in confirming new appointees to replace those removed by the
President. See Seth Barrett Tillman, The Puzzle of Hamilton’s Federalist No. 77, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 149 (2010). Although this is a provocative thesis, I believe that it is an unlikely one, largely for
reasons captured in a response essay by Professor Jeremy D. Bailey. See Jeremy D. Bailey, The
Traditional View of Hamilton’s Federalist No. 77 and an Unexpected Challenge: A Response to Seth
Barrett Tillman, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 169 (2010). Even if Tillman’s thesis were accurate, the
record is clear that at least some founders understood Hamilton to have been referring to the removal
power, and that others, including Tench Coxe, publicly expressed the view that the President’s removal
power was not unlimited. See Tillman, supra, at 165–167; see also supra notes 214–15 and accompany-
ing text.
217. See Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability and Administrative Structure, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 607,
629–34 (2009).
218. See id.
219. This was famously observed by Madison in Federalist 47, who cited the examples of the states
to demonstrate that it was neither possible nor desirable to completely separate the three “departments
of power.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also
M. J. C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 131–33, 146–49, 154–74 (2d ed. 1998)
(1967); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 153–56 (1969);
Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 211, 217–19 (1989); Edward S. Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between
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dated legislative involvement in both personnel and superintendence. Nothing
in the records of the Convention demonstrates that exclusivity suddenly became
the norm in 1787,” and that the Vesting Clause could only reasonably have been
understood to encompass such a norm.220 To the contrary, participants in the
framing and ratification debates likened the U.S. President’s proposed executive
powers to those of state governors.221 Post-founding practices, too, belie the
notion that the Constitution conveyed a widely understood directive of undi-
vided presidential control over all executive activity.222 Professor Susan Low
Bloch aptly describes the view of administration reflected in Congress’ earliest
actions: “The question was one of degree—the degree of presidential control.
The First Congress established varying levels of presidential control over
various officials depending on the function of the officer involved. The early
legislators established gradations of presidential control along functional, flex-
ible lines.”223
To deem a categorical unity mandate the only reasonable interpretation of the
Vesting Clause, one must deem unconvincing or irrelevant both the textual
arguments made above and the substantial evidence against a founding consen-
sus that the Vesting Clause embodied unity. Alternatively, a unity proponent
could simply disregard the existence of a reasonable alternative reading on the
basis that only one reading can be “best,” as original meaning is determined on
a winner-takes-all basis. Either approach also can be bolstered by the objective
component of public meaning originalism. To a public meaning originalist, the
objective original meaning of the executive power could embody unity even if
not a single member of the founding generation realized this fact.
On the other hand, interpretive modesty counsels that if the unity and
anti-unity interpretations both are reasonable, only the thin common core that
those interpretations share—that is, that the president must retain at least a
supervisory power over all executive officials and activities—ought to be
deemed locked in as a matter of original meaning. The unity directive thus
would not be imposed categorically as a matter of interpretation. However,
unity-based arguments from construction could be made, case-by-case, against
particular statutes and practices.
C. THE ROLE OF PRINCIPLES IN AND PRECEDING THE CONSTRUCTION ZONE
Arguments about constitutional principle also play an important role in
debates over unitary executive theory. Unity proponents argue that the constitu-
the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 AM. HIST. REV.
511, 514, 516 (1925); Flaherty, supra note 9, at 1765–71, 1776–77.
220. Flaherty, supra note 9, at 1791; see also sources cited supra note 198.
221. See, e.g., Michael P. Riccards, The Presidency and the Ratification Controversy, 7 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 37, 38, 41, 44 (1977) (citing arguments made by Federalists during the ratification process to
the effect that the President’s powers were not meaningfully greater than those of state governors).
222. See KITROSSER, supra note 10, at 150–51 and sources cited therein.
223. Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In
the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 582.
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tional value of accountability bolsters their original meaning arguments and also
has independent significance. To the extent that they argue the point of indepen-
dent significance, they are making something akin to a construction argument.
That is, they implicitly argue that, even if the constitutional text alone did not
encompass unity as a matter of original meaning, a categorical unity directive
should be constructed to serve constitutional principles.
The accountability arguments for unity inadvertently reveal two additional
points against determinacy and in favor of interpretive modesty. First, there are
serious shortcomings in unity proponents’ understandings of founding concerns
about accountability. These problems undermine their claim that accountability-
based reasoning bolsters their original meaning arguments. This provides yet
another basis to doubt that a categorical unity directive is the only plausible
interpretation of the Vesting Clause, and to favor the relative caution of interpre-
tive modesty. Second, when the value of accountability is properly understood,
it is easy to see how unity can hinder accountability in many cases. The
construction zone thus is the proper place to evaluate, case-by-case, when given
breaches of unity so undermine accountability that they ought to be invalidated,
and when such breaches pass muster and perhaps even further accountability.
This point, too, illustrates the relative constitutional protectiveness of interpre-
tive modesty.
In arguing from accountability, unitary executive theorists note that the
President is the only nationally elected figure in American politics. If he or she
controls the execution of all laws in the United States, then the national
electorate has a clear object of blame or reward for such activity. Unity
supporters also argue that the founders shared their concerns about accountabil-
ity. Evidence of such founding concerns, they say, further illuminates the
founding decision to create a fully unitary executive.224
Yet a fuller consideration of accountability as it relates to the presidency
reveals a far more complex historical picture. Although accountability indeed
was a central founding preoccupation, conceptions of accountability extended
well beyond the ballot-box mechanisms to which unity proponents refer. The
founders assumed the need for myriad means to ensure sufficient information
flow to make the franchise meaningful. Indeed, although Federalists extolled the
accountability and energy of a single President, they coupled such analyses with
assurances of the various checks that the President would encounter both within
and outside of the executive branch.225 Among other things, they asserted that
the President would be unable to manipulate his subordinates so as to cloak his
misdoings.226
224. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 5, at 35–37, 59, 65–66; Prakash, supra note 201, at 701,
731–32, 751–52, 783–85.
225. See KITROSSER, supra note 10, at 152–61 and sources cited therein.
226. See id. at 153–55, 159–61 and sources cited therein.
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Furthermore, accountability-based arguments about plans for the presidency
were extremely fact specific, emphasizing the impact of particular proposals on
accountability, rather than supporting a broad unity directive. For example,
unity proponents rely partly on the founding decision against annexing an
advisory council to the President. In so doing, unity proponents cite founding
fears that the President would hide behind his council, blaming it for his own
poor decisions and thus defeating accountability. From this, unity proponents
leap to the conclusion that the founders wanted the President to fully control all
discretionary executive decisions and executive officers.227 Yet this conclusion
massively oversimplifies the nature of the council debate. Council opponents
focused on features specific to the proposed council, including its small size and
its ability to collude with the President in relative secrecy. Notably, they also
feared that the President and his council would seek to appoint executive branch
officers who “possess[ed] the necessary insignificance and pliancy to render
them the obsequious instruments of [the President’s] pleasure.”228 At minimum,
the council debate, centering as it did on the specific features of the proposed
council, simply did not address whether the executive branch must in all
respects be unitary. If anything, the accountability-related concerns articulated
in the debate suggest that the founders feared full presidential control over
executive branch decision making and officers. Unfettered control could, among
other things, foster secretive collusions between the President and those in his
thrall.
The divisions among the founders over presidential accountability thus were
not about unity versus non-unity as those terms are used today. Rather, the
founding disagreements were fact-specific ones over the nuances of particular
proposals for the top of the executive branch—that is for the structure of the
presidency itself—and over the proposals’ predicted effects on meaningful
accountability, including the ability of the people to discover misdeeds.
A careful look at accountability in founding-era debates over the presidency
thus provides additional ground to argue that unity is, at most, one of two
plausible interpretations of the original meaning of the Vesting Clause. This
insight further illustrates the virtue of caution, through interpretive modesty, in
deriving original meaning. It also takes us further still, to the affirmative value
of constitutional construction. Just as the founders recognized that unfettered
presidential control might help in some cases and hinder accountability in
others, the same is true today. For example, presidential administrations for
decades have taken the view that the Constitution demands an unfettered White
House power to preclear public testimony or reports offered by anyone who
exercises discretionary executive power.229 Although such control surely has
227. See id. at 146 and sources cited therein.
228. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 458 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,1961); see also
KITROSSER, supra note 10, at 152–55 and sources cited therein.
229. See KITROSSER, supra note 10, at 180–81 and sources cited therein.
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advantages, it also poses obvious risks to accountability, enabling the White
House to quash testimony that may be deeply informative to the public but
politically damaging to the President. And as I have detailed elsewhere, there
are many other forms of unitary presidential control that can undermine account-
ability in the administrative state.230 Challenges to particular breaches of unity
on the basis that such breaches hinder constitutional accountability are thus
ideal subjects for construction. In the construction zone, courts and other
interpreters can engage in functional analyses to determine whether accountabil-
ity and other constitutional values are helped or hindered by particular breaches
of unity. This is a different, considerably more cautious and fine-tuned approach
than is an unyielding, categorical unity directive.
CONCLUSION
Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld once famously said that “there
are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not
know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we
don’t know.”231 Too often, constitutional interpreters appear not to know what
they don’t know. This Article is a plea to turn our unknown unknowns into
known unknowns, and to do a better job of addressing the latter.
To face up to our epistemic limits about original meanings is not to abandon
the Constitution or our faith in it. To the contrary, interpretive modesty is a
better means to approach interpretive precision than its alternatives. By demand-
ing attention to actual understandings evidence as well as public meaning
evidence, it can help us to avoid anachronistic interpretations. And in acknowl-
edging that we lack a principled means to choose the most correct from among
plausible interpretations, interpretive modesty can keep us from making arbi-
trary choices about original meanings. Interpretive modesty also enables us to
identify what we do know, that is, the range of plausible original meanings for
given constitutional terms and any common denominator of thin meaning
between them. And in the construction zone, interpretive modesty provides a
forum within which constitutional principles and their application can be de-
bated on their own terms, without couching the inquiry as a search for original
textual definitions.
Beyond its epistemic advantages, interpretive modesty bears at least two sets
of normative advantages. First, there are the advantages that Jack Balkin
associates with thin constitutional meanings and a relatively wide construction
zone. That is, such a scheme connects us to our constitutional past, present, and
future by placing us within the Constitution’s framework while enabling us to
apply that framework and its underlying principles and purposes to current
230. See id. at 180–94 and sources cited therein.
231. Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Department of Defense News Briefing (Feb. 12,
2002) (transcript available at http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID
2636).
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conditions. Second, there are democratic legitimacy advantages to be gained
through the candor that interpretive modesty facilitates. This point is intuitive,
and also is bolstered by social psychology research finding that “exaggerated
certitude in judicial opinion writing” fosters public cynicism.232 Interpretive
modesty pushes against these alienating judicial norms. It encourages interpret-
ers to acknowledge the epistemic limits of discerning original meaning. And it
supplements those limits with construction that is constitutionally bounded, and
that is candid about the discretion that it does entail.
232. See supra notes 175–77 and accompanying text.
514 [Vol. 104:459THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
